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ABSTRACT 
Transfer pricing is a continuously evolving phenomenon and is a topical issue world-wide.  
With increasing inter-company cross-border transactions, multinational enterprises are using 
loopholes in the interaction of tax legislation of different countries as a tool to shift profits to a 
more favourable jurisdiction, thereby avoiding tax in the jurisdiction in which they are resident 
and eroding the resident jurisdiction’s tax base.  This research report examines and discusses the 
substituted South African transfer pricing legislation that applies for the years of assessment 
commencing on or after 1 April 2012 as well as the related SARS guidance.  An analysis of 
transfer pricing legislation and guidelines in three selected countries and the OECD transfer 
pricing guidelines will also be performed.  The comparisons of the legislation and guidelines 
will highlight whether there are still weaknesses in the South African transfer pricing legislation 
and will indicate possible solutions to these weaknesses which will assist in reducing the 
erosion of the South African tax base. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
‘HMRC’:  Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
‘KRA’:  Kenyan Revenue Authority 
‘OECD’:  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
‘OECD Model Tax Convention’:  OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
‘OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines’:  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrators 
‘SARS’:  the South African Revenue Service 
‘the Act’:  Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
‘the Tax Administration Act’:  Tax Administration Act 26 of 2011 
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CHAPTER 1:  Introduction and overview 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the topic, it provides an understanding of what transfer pricing is and 
how it is used to shift profits and erode tax bases.  The significance of the research will be 
discussed together with the problems and sub-problems identified.  The research methodology 
used and limitations of the research report will also be highlighted.  
1.2. What is transfer pricing? 
Transfer pricing is a topical issue in the international market as a significant volume of 
international trade arises from companies entering into cross-border transactions with connected 
persons (within their group of companies) (United Nations Department of Economic & Social 
Affairs 2013:1).  Transfer pricing can be used as a tax avoidance tool by multinational 
enterprises to shift profits, by entering into non-arm’s length transactions between connected 
parties, in an attempt to pay less tax by the group of companies as a whole (United Nations 
Department of Economic & Social Affairs 2013:5).  The ultimate result of these profit shifting 
transactions is base erosion (OECD 2013b:5). 
Transactions entered into by connected parties within a group of companies are not exposed to 
the same market forces as transactions entered into between independent parties (United Nations 
Department of Economic & Social Affairs 2013:1).  The pricing of intra-group cross-border 
transfer of goods, intangibles or services is essentially known as the ‘transfer pricing’ and these 
transactions are referred to as ‘controlled’ transactions as the transaction price can be controlled 
by the entities involved because they are not independent parties (United Nations Department of 
Economic & Social Affairs 2013:2).  The arm's length principle is an internationally accepted 
principle underlying transfer pricing (OCED 2013b:36) which has been endorsed by both the 
OECD and the United Nations Tax Committee (United Nations Department of Economic & 
Social Affairs 2013:11).  In order for the transfer price to be at arm’s length, the price at which 
the goods or services would have been sold to a non-connected/independent party would have to 
be determined (OECD 2010:33).  When transfer pricing is not executed at arm’s length and at 
market-related conditions, the tax liabilities of those connected parties and the related tax 
revenues of the tax jurisdiction could be distorted (OECD 2010:32). 
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If a tax administration identifies that multinationals/entities are transacting with their connected 
parties at prices which are not arm’s length, according to domestic law, in order to obtain an 
overall benefit (by reducing the total/consolidated tax paid by the group); the issue of potential 
tax avoidance could arise (United Nations Department of Economic & Social Affairs 2013:2).  
The only way to restrict this tax avoidance is by putting in place anti-avoidance legislation.  
However, it should be noted that with the general anti-avoidance provisions, it could become 
difficult to successfully challenge related party transactions, hence there is a need for specific 
anti-avoidance transfer pricing provisions (United Nations Department of Economic & Social 
Affairs 2013:335).  In transfer pricing the ‘what would independent parties do’ approach is used 
and where it is found that there is ‘no commercial rationale’ behind the taxpayer's conduct, anti-
avoidance provisions are triggered (Venter 2013). 
Tax avoidance is the use of perfectly legal means of arranging a taxpayer’s affairs, for example, 
by exploiting loopholes in the tax legislation and making use of these loopholes to the 
taxpayer’s advantage (Haupt 2016:638).  The transaction is thus regarded as a bona fide 
transaction which has the effect of avoiding tax or reducing the tax liability in a particular 
jurisdiction.  The only way in which tax avoidance transactions or schemes can be restricted is if 
the legislature identifies these loopholes and amends the legislation or includes further anti-
avoidance provisions in order to curb the tax avoidance in the future (Haupt 2016:638).  
It should be noted that the underlying contractual obligations would not be affected by the need 
to make a tax adjustment to reflect the arm's length principle for tax anti-avoidance purposes 
(OECD 2010:31). 
1.3. What is base erosion and profit shifting? 
‘Base erosion was recognised as a serious threat to tax revenues, tax sovereignty and tax 
fairness’ for all countries (Sweidan 2013).  With increasing inter-company cross-border 
transactions, multinational enterprises are using loopholes in the interaction of the varying tax 
legislation of different countries as a tool to shift profits so that they appear lower in a country 
with higher tax rates, yet higher in a country with lower tax rates (OECD 2013b:5-6).  The 
outcome that results from this phenomenon is base erosion and profit shifting by either double 
non-taxation or a reduction in high tax jurisdictions’ tax base (Adams & Adams 2016:3).  
Multinational enterprises use various techniques to manipulate their taxable income in the 
jurisdictions in which they operate which results in major losses in domestic tax revenue for 
those jurisdictions (Adams & Adams 2016:0).  Profit shifting is the most significant source of 
base erosion (OECD 2013b:5).   
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As multinational enterprises integrate across borders, they create corporate structures which are 
legal but which take advantage of asymmetries in the tax provisions domestically and 
internationally (OECD 2013b:49).  Governments recognise this phenomenon and acknowledge 
that a change in this legal framework can only be achieved through a holistic approach which 
requires international co-operation and collaboration in order to strengthen domestic actions to 
protect tax bases and to provide a comprehensive world-wide solution to the issue of base 
erosion and profit shifting (OECD 2013b:51).  Although co-ordination will be key in the 
implementation of any solution to base erosion and profit shifting, all countries may not 
necessarily use the same tools/provisions to address the issue (OECD 2013b:8).  
It may be difficult for a single country, acting alone, to fully address this issue of base erosion, it 
is therefore recommended by the OECD that a universal approach is required to properly 
address the issue of base erosion and profit shifting (OECD 2013b:7-8).  This can be done by 
the local Governments by taking actions such as, inter alia, striking a balance between source 
and residence based taxation; imposing tax provisions relating to intra-group financial 
transactions; and implementing anti-abuse and transfer pricing provisions (OECD 2013b:7).   
1.4. Transfer pricing in the South African context 
As the protection of a jurisdiction’s tax base is of vital importance, transfer pricing has become 
a priority area for African countries, like South Africa (Adams & Adams 2016:4).   
For developing countries, such as South Africa, transfer pricing legislation is of utmost 
importance as it creates certainty for foreign investors and an environment for increased cross-
border trade but at the same time ensures that the jurisdiction is not losing out on its rightful 
share of tax revenue (OECD 2013b:6-7). 
As South African subsidiaries of off-shore multinational enterprises increase their market-share 
and earn more revenue in the South African jurisdiction, their South African taxable income 
may rise resulting in an increase in tax payable.  This increase in tax payable reduces the net 
profit after tax of the company thereby reducing the returns to the shareholders.  It is contended 
by multinational enterprises that they legally reduce the taxes paid by their entities as a result of 
their responsibility towards their shareholders to earn profits (Davis Tax Committee BEPS Sub-
Committee 2014a:9).  In order to reduce an increased tax charge, multinational enterprises may 
set up schemes in the form of cross-border transactions in order to shift the taxable profits from 
the subsidiary in the South African jurisdiction (where it is resident) which has a higher tax rate 
to a jurisdiction which has more favourable lower tax rate, which may include jurisdictions 
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which are so-called tax havens.  The typical transaction would entail the South African entity 
paying a sum of money in respect of goods or services (such as, inter alia, management fees, 
royalties and interest) to a connected party in a jurisdiction which has more favourable tax rates.  
The South African entity therefore gets a deduction in terms of s 11(a) of the Act (for 
management fees and royalties) or s 24J of the Act (with respect to interest) in respect of the 
goods purchased or services received and in so doing, the tax expense in the South African 
jurisdiction is reduced and the total tax payment by that group of companies is reduced. 
1.5. Statement of the problem  
What recommendations can be identified in respect of improvements to the South African 
transfer pricing legislation (in s 31 of the Act) and SARS practices, from a comparison between 
s 31 of the Act and SARS practices and the transfer pricing legislation and practices of three 
selected countries, namely Kenya, India, the United Kingdom and the published guidelines of 
the OECD? 
1.6. The sub-problems 
1.6.1. The first sub-problem is to determine what the current transfer pricing legislation and 
practice is in South Africa.  The transfer pricing legislation in South Africa is covered in 
s 31 of the Act and the practice of SARS is set out in Practice Note 7 Section 31 of the 
Income Tax Act, 1962 (the Act): Determination of the taxable income of certain persons 
from international transactions: Transfer pricing and the addendum thereto.  Section 31 
of the Act was substituted (National Treasury 2011:116-117; 154) for years of 
assessment commencing on or after 1 April 2012.   
1.6.2. The second sub-problem is to determine what the current transfer pricing legislation and 
practice is of each of the three selected countries.  The three countries selected for 
comparison are Kenya, India and the United Kingdom.  The reason for the selection of 
Kenya and India
1
 is that they are developing countries like South Africa and they are 
                                                                                                                                                     
1  According to the World Bank, the term developed countries/economies is used for high-income 
countries/economies while the term developing is used to denote all low- and middle-income 
countries/economies. The term ‘developing’ is used for convenience; it is not intended to imply that 
all economies in the group are experiencing similar development or that other economies have reached 
a preferred or final stage of development. As of 1 July 2015, low-income economies are defined as 
those with a gross national income (‘GNI’) per capita of $1 025 or less in 2015; middle-income 
economies are those with a GNI per capita of more than $1 026 but less than $12 475; high-income 
economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12 746 or more. Lower-middle-income and upper-
middle-income economies are separated at a GNI per capita of $4 036. Kenya is a lower-middle 
income country as its GNI per capita was $1 340 in 2015. India is a lower-middle income country as 
its GNI per capita was $1 590 in 2015. South Africa is an upper-middle income country as its GNI per 
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not OECD member countries (OECD 2016b) however they have been quite aggressive 
in their approach to transfer pricing in recent years (Amable 2012; Spearman 2013).  
The reason for the selection of the United Kingdom is that it is a developed
2
 country and 
is a member country of the OECD.  The second reason for the selection of these three 
countries is that their transfer pricing legislation has been tested by the courts.  The 
transfer pricing legislation and case law of the three selected countries that will be 
discussed in the report are as follows: 
 Kenya:  The transfer pricing provisions are in s 18(3) of the Income Tax Act and 
Legal Notice no.67 of 2006 (Deloitte 2016:152).  A transfer pricing case heard by 
the Kenyan court was Unilever Kenya Ltd v CoT Income Tax Appeal 753 of 2003. 
 India:  The transfer pricing provisions are in s 92, 92A, 92B, 92C, 92CA, 92CB, 
92CC, 92CD, 92D and 92F of Chapter X of the Income-tax Act 1961 and the 
relevant rules for transfer pricing are rule 10A to 10TG of Income-tax Rules 1962 
(OECD 2012; Deloitte 2016:123).  A transfer pricing case heard by the Indian court 
was CIT v Glaxo SmithKline Asia (P) Ltd (2010) 236 CTR (SC) 113. 
 United Kingdom:  The current transfer pricing rules are in Part 4 of the Taxation 
(International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 (Deloitte 2016:263).  A transfer 
pricing case heard by the United Kingdom court was DSG Retail Ltd v HMRC 
(2009) UK FTT 31 (TC) 1. 
1.6.3. The third sub-problem is to determine what the current OECD transfer pricing 
guidelines are. These guidelines are based on Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention (OECD 2010:33).  While South Africa is not a member country of the 
OECD, South Africa tends to follow the OECD transfer pricing guidelines (Grant 
Thornton 2014).  The OECD (OECD 2008:2) indicates that:  
‘…The Organisation provides a setting where governments can compare policy 
experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and work 
to co-ordinate domestic and international policies…’   
It is therefore useful to determine whether South Africa is in fact following these 
guidelines in relation to its transfer pricing legislation as the OECD transfer pricing 
guidelines can be used as benchmark for international practice.  
                                                                                                                                                     
capita was $6 050 in 2015. All three countries are therefore considered to be developing countries 
according to the World Bank statistics. (http://data.worldbank.org/news/2015-country-classifications).  
2  According to the World Bank, the United Kingdom is a high income country as the GNI per capita 
was $43 340 in 2015.  
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1.6.4. The fourth sub-problem is to compare s 31 of the Act and SARS practice to the transfer 
pricing legislation and practice of the three selected countries as well as the OECD 
transfer pricing guidelines.  The initial comparison has led to the identification of 
potential weaknesses in the South African transfer pricing legislation and practices, for 
example: 
 There are no specific penalty provisions which have been included in s 31 of the Act 
for instances where non-compliance is identified.  
 South Africa does not make use of advance pricing agreements.  Advance pricing 
agreements are used as a tool by revenue authorities to resolve potential transfer 
pricing disputes in advance based on verified facts and circumstances.  
1.6.5. The fifth sub-problem is what recommendations can be identified, with respect to 
improving s 31 of the Act, from the comparisons made between the three selected 
countries and the OECD transfer pricing guidelines.   
1.7. Research methodology 
The research methodology used will be qualitative. The main sources of data used are primary 
and secondary materials. Primary sources included domestic legislation, regulations and 
guidelines (of the country on which research is conducted) as well as international guidelines. 
Secondary sources consulted include books, journal articles and articles. The most recent and 
up-to-date primary sources will be utilised for the research report.   
As a detailed analysis of the transfer pricing legislation and practice of the three selected 
countries is beyond the scope of this report, the main focus areas of the legislation and practice 
will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2:  South Africa’s transfer pricing legislation and practice 
2.1. History  
It was found by the Katz Commission (Katz 1994:231) that the general anti-avoidance provision 
was an ineffective tool to provide the necessary protection against transfer pricing in South 
Africa.  The South African tax legislation required ‘legislative teeth’ to protect itself from the 
abuse afforded by relaxation in exchange control regulations, excessive price manipulation 
between connected parties and to correct the imbalance of disproportionate funding by foreign 
investors through debt as opposed to equity (i.e. thin capitalisation
3
) (Katz 1994:231; Katz 
1995:1).  On the other hand, a balance was required between protecting the tax base and 
imposing legislation so rigorous that the provisions become a deterrent for foreign investment 
(Katz 1994:231).  The anti-avoidance transfer pricing and thin capitalisation legislation was 
introduced in 1995 as s 31 of the Act based on the findings from the Katz Commission (Katz 
1995:8).  On recommendation from the Katz Commission, the transfer pricing legislation was 
based on a flexible arm’s length principle, as per the OECD guidelines, to dictate acceptable 
pricing practice (Katz 1994:232; Katz 1995:2).  The ‘relatively simple’ United Kingdom rules 
(which relied strongly on the OECD guidelines) were considered to be a ‘valid model’ for the 
South African transfer pricing provisions (Katz 1994:232).  In addition, the Katz Commission 
recommended that a Practice Note relating to thin capitalisation should be issued, by the then 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue, now called SARS, to provide all stakeholders with a ‘high 
degree of predictability’ and guidance in the application of the provisions, but would not be so 
rigid so as actually to constitute the legislation (Katz 1995:8).  
The Katz Commission further suggested that in order to provide a measure of certainty to 
international investors, advance pricing agreements should be considered for companies to agree 
to an acceptable pricing range in advance with the South African revenue authorities, thereby 
avoiding future disputes (Katz 1994:233).  It was acknowledged by the Katz Commission that 
the then Inland Revenue, did not have the capacity or sufficiently trained personnel to provide 
advance pricing agreements, therefore this aspect should be outsourced (Katz 1994:233).  
Provisions relating to advance pricing agreements were not put in place in 1995 and these 
agreements are currently not available to taxpayers (Deloitte 2016:236).  
                                                                                                                                                     
3  Thin capitalisation refers to the situation in which a company is financed through a relatively high 
level of debt in comparison to equity. These companies are referred to as highly geared or highly 
leveraged companies (OECD Secretariat 2012b:3).  
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The South African transfer pricing legislation had various amendments over a period of 16 
years.  In 2010, SARS announced their intention to fundamentally realign the transfer pricing 
provisions with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Honiball and Delahaye 2013).  The 
substituted s 31 (transfer pricing legislation) was brought into effect for years of assessment 
commencing on or after 1 April 2012.  The new transfer pricing provisions are, according to 
National Treasury, now aligned to the wording of the OECD and United Nations Model Tax 
Convention and are consistent with South African tax treaties and other international tax 
principles (National Treasury 2010:76).  Further amendments have been made to the substituted 
legislation to date.  The fundamental arm’s length principle, according to Article 9 of the OECD 
and United Nations Model Tax Convention, has not been revised and has remained the 
foundation of the South African transfer pricing legislation from inception as it is the 
internationally accepted transfer pricing principle (United Nations Department of Economic & 
Social Affairs 2013:409; SARS 1999:8).  
2.2. Analysis of the substituted s 31 transfer pricing legislation  
In summary, s 31 of the Act is applied where any affected transaction, being a cross-border 
transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding, and any term or condition imposed 
thereof results in or will result in a South African tax benefit for one of the connected parties to 
that transaction, then the taxable income of the parties that have benefitted must be calculated as 
if that transaction had been entered into at arm's length (Davis Tax Committee BEPS Sub-
Committee 2014b:16; Adams & Adams 2016:1).  In South Africa the OECD methods, which 
are encapsulated in SARS Practice Note 7, are used to determine an arm’s length price (Davis 
Tax Committee BEPS Sub-Committee 2014b:16). 
The substituted South African transfer pricing provisions’ wording, in s 31 of the Act, is now 
aligned to the OECD Model Tax Convention, which focuses on the economic substance of the 
related party transactions rather than the pricing of the specific transactions (Brodbeck 2012).  
South Africa thus, according to OECD’s recommendation, utilises the arm’s length principle to 
curtail transfer pricing.   
2.2.1. Section 31(2) wording:  Affected transaction being ‘any transaction, operation, 
scheme, agreement or understanding’ 
With the use of these words there has been a shift from a single transaction approach to an 
entity-based approach (Honiball and Delahaye 2013).  In doing so, the scope of the transfer 
pricing provisions is broadened and encompasses the overall profit, the ‘economic substance 
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and the commercial objective of the arrangement’ with the related party/parties (National 
Treasury 2010:75).  
By the adoption of a holistic approach in the substituted s 31, SARS is seeking to gain an 
understanding of the multinational group’s entire business process by obtaining a 
comprehensive understanding of the commercial rationale prevailing over the intra-group 
transactions, the agreements, the arrangements and so forth in order to determine whether a 
suitable arm’s length profit has been derived (United Nations Department of Economic & Social 
Affairs 2013:411).  
This wording is likewise aligned with the definition of ‘arrangement’ under the South African 
general anti-avoidance regulations contained in s 80A to s 80L of the Act which must be read 
together with s 34 to s 39 (reportable arrangements) of the Tax Administration Act.   
2.2.2. Section 31(2):  Determination of the arm’s length consideration 
Guidance on how to determine the arm’s length consideration is provided in SARS Practice 
Note 7.  This guidance is based on the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
The determination of the arm’s length consideration is not ‘exact science’ hence what is 
generally accepted is a range of arm’s length prices, however, this range could be wide and 
SARS Practice Note 7 indicates that it is doubtful whether all the points in the calculated range 
are arm’s length prices (Joubert, Woolmer and du Preez 2016:4).  Conversely, where the 
traditional OECD transactional method is used to calculate the arm’s length range, any point 
within this range is acceptable (Joubert et al 2016:4). 
A great amount of judgement is required in order to determine the most appropriate point in the 
arm’s length range which would be applicable to the taxpayer, this point can also be affected by 
other factors, such as the taxpayer’s risk profile (Joubert et al 2016:4).  
2.2.3. Section 31(2):  Thin capitalisation provisions 
Previously, the thin capitalisation provisions were dealt with under a separate subsection of s 31 
of the Act, however, with the substituted provisions, the thin capitalisation provisions have now 
been incorporated into the general transfer pricing provision under s 31(2) of the Act (SARS 
2013a:4).   
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The debt:equity safe harbour of 3:1 was replaced with an arm's length test rendering SARS 
Practice Note 2, which contained guidelines relating to the safe harbour, redundant (Brodbeck 
2012). 
The arm's length approach to thin capitalisation is the determination of the funding that the 
taxpayer would have been able to secure in the open market (Honiball and Delahaye 2013).  
Although SARS has introduced this arm’s length test, no official guidance has to date been 
provided for the determination of the arm's length thin capitalisation rules which is an area of 
great concern (Honiball and Delahaye 2013).   
A draft Interpretation Note, which is discussed in further detail in part 2.4.1 of this report, was 
released in 2013 with no final Interpretation Note published.   
2.2.4. Section 31(3):  Secondary adjustment 
Where a transfer pricing adjustment (the difference between the arm’s length price and the price 
actually charged) is made by the taxpayer or SARS, a secondary adjustment is required to be 
made in terms of s 31(3) of the Act.  The secondary adjustment is implemented as follows: 
 Prior to 1 January 2015, the difference gave rise to a deemed loan on which arm’s 
length deemed interest would have accrued to the taxpayer, resulting in taxable 
income for the taxpayer (National Treasury 2014:61). 
 With effect from 1 January 2015, the difference is deemed to be a dividend in specie 
declared and paid by the South African company
4
 to the connected party (s 31(3)(i)) 
which is subject to dividend withholding tax in the hands of the South African 
company at the rate of 15% (s 64E).  The reason for this change was the 
administrative burden for both the taxpayer and SARS as the accounting treatment of 
the deemed loan was not practical and there were potential exchange control issues 
(National Treasury 2014:61-62).  
 Owing to the change in the secondary adjustment, all existing deemed loans which 
arose prior to 1 January 2015 were converted to deemed dividends in specie, in the 
case of a company
5
, on 1 January 2015 (proviso (a) to s 31(3)) and were accordingly 
                                                                                                                                                     
4  In terms of s 31(3)(ii), where the person is not a company, the difference will be deemed to be a 
donation.  
5  In terms of proviso (b) to s 31(3), where the person is not a company, the existing deemed loans were 
converted to a deemed donation. 
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subject to the dividend withholding tax of 15% (s 64E) in the hands of the South 
African company (Joubert et al 2016:4; National Treasury 2014:62). 
2.2.5. Obligation to make the s 31 adjustment 
In terms of s 31(2) of the Act, by the use of the words ‘must be calculated’, the onus is on the 
taxpayer to make a transfer pricing adjustment in order to reflect the arm’s length consideration 
of the transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding (Joubert et al 2016:2).  This 
onus, however, does not in any way reduce SARS’ powers to make a further adjustment where 
SARS is of the view that the taxpayer has incorrectly determined the transfer pricing adjustment 
(Joubert et al 2016:2). 
2.3. Penalties and interest relating to the transfer pricing provisions  
Understatement penalty 
There is no specific penalty in s 31 of the Act which applies to transfer pricing adjustments.  An 
understatement penalty can be imposed where the Commissioner finds that the taxpayer’s 
transfer pricing adjustment was not at arm’s length (Deloitte 2016:235).  
In terms of s 222 of the Tax Administration Act, in the event of an ‘understatement’ (which is 
defined in s 221 of the Tax Administration Act as: a default in rendering a return; an omission 
in a return; an incorrect statement in a return; or where no return was required, failure to pay the 
correct amount of tax) by a taxpayer, the taxpayer must pay, in addition to the tax payable for 
the relevant tax period, the penalty determined by applying the highest applicable 
understatement penalty to the ‘shortfall’ unless the ‘understatement’ results from a ‘bona fide 
inadvertent error’, in which case no penalty will be levied (s 222(1) of the Act).  ‘Bona fide 
inadvertent error’ has not been defined in the Tax Administration Act or the Act and is, in the 
author’s view, a very subjective phrase which many taxpayers may try to use so that no 
understatement penalty can be imposed.   
A fixed penalty percentage is determined in terms of a table in s 223 of the Tax Administration 
Act which is based on the behaviour and the conduct of the taxpayer, which is again, in the 
author’s view, very subjective.  
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Table: Understatement penalty percentage table 
  
     
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Item Behaviour 
Standard 
case 
If 
obstructive, 
or if it is a 
‘repeat 
case’ 
Voluntary 
disclosure after 
notification of 
audit or 
investigation 
Voluntary 
disclosure before 
notification of 
audit or 
investigation 
(i) ‘Substantial understatement’ 10% 20% 5% 0% 
(ii) 
Reasonable care not taken in 
completing return 
25% 50% 15% 0% 
(iii) 
No reasonable grounds for 
‘tax position’ taken 
50% 75% 25% 0% 
(iv) Gross negligence 100% 125% 50% 5% 
(v) Intentional tax evasion 150% 200% 75% 10% 
SARS has published a guide in relation to the Tax Administration Act which includes guidance 
on the above table with respect to the behaviours and the conduct (SARS 2013b:79-81).  As 
each case is different, the understatement penalty imposed will be based on the facts, the 
circumstances and the behaviour associated with the specific case.   
SARS may remit the understatement penalty (s 223(3) of the Tax Administration Act) if it is 
satisfied that the taxpayer:  
 Made full disclosure of the arrangement, in terms of s 34 of the Tax Administration 
Act (reportable arrangements), at the time of submission of the return; or 
 Was in possession of an opinion by an independent registered tax practitioner upon 
submitting the return and that opinion would be upheld in a court of law. 
In terms of s 224 of the Tax Administration Act, the taxpayer may object to the understatement 
penalty imposed by SARS.  
Non-compliance with documentation requirements 
In terms of s 210 of the Tax Administration Act, if SARS is satisfied that a taxpayer failed to 
comply with an obligation that is imposed by or under a tax Act and is listed in a public notice 
issued by the Commissioner, as is the case for the notice to keep transfer pricing documentation 
(SARS 2016b), SARS must impose the appropriate penalty in accordance with s 211 of the Tax 
Administration Act as follows: 
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Table: Amount of administrative non-compliance penalty 
  
  
1 
Item 
2 
Assessed loss or taxable income for ‘preceding year’ 
3 
‘Penalty’ 
(i) Assessed loss R250 
(ii) R0 – R250 000 R250 
(iii) R250 001 – R500 000 R500 
(iv) R500 001 – R1 000 000 R1 000 
(v) R1 000 001 – R5 000 000 R2 000 
(vi) R5 000 001 – R10 000 000 R4 000 
(vii) R10 000 001 – R50 000 000 R8 000 
(viii) Above R50 000 000 R16 000 
It is submitted that, in most transfer pricing instances, the highest penalty of R16 000 will be 
applicable.  This penalty is minimal taking into consideration that the transfer pricing 
documentation requirement will be an important source of information and will speed up the 
audit process.  It is further submitted that SARS should consider imposing specific penalties 
relating to non-compliance with documentation requirements. 
Interest 
Interest, at the current rate of 10.25% effective from 1 May 2016 (SARS 2016f), applies to both 
the tax on the under-reported income and the penalties imposed on the taxpayer in terms of s 
89quat of the Act (Deloitte 2016:235).  
2.4. Analysis of the guidelines issued by SARS related to s 31 transfer pricing legislation  
2.4.1. SARS Practice Note 2 
SARS Practice Note 2, which was issued in May 1996 and amended in May 2002, dealt with 
the debt:equity safe harbour of 3:1 for thin capitalisation purposes.  With the substitution of the 
transfer pricing provisions, the debt:equity safe harbour was replaced with an arm's length test, 
making SARS Practice Note 2 redundant (Brodbeck 2012).  
A draft Interpretation Note to replace the outdated Practice Note 2 was released in April 2013 
entitled Determination of the Taxable Income of Certain Persons from International 
Transactions: Thin Capitalisation (SARS 2013a). 
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In terms of the draft Interpretation Note, SARS would focus on funding arrangements coming 
from offshore connected parties to South African entities to assess whether there is a genuine 
‘business need or reason or commercial benefit for the additional finance’ (SARS 2013a:7).   
The taxpayer would be required to prepare a function analysis in relation to the funding 
arrangement, providing documented details such as, inter alia: 
 The group structure and an understanding of the business;  
 The funding structure, including, inter alia, the source, the relevant dates; and terms 
and conditions of loan funding indicating the interest rates and repayment terms;  
 The financial strategy of the entity including the allocation and the utilisation of the 
funding by providing cash flow information;  
 The credit worthiness of the entity (if available); and 
 The security available.  
(SARS 2013a:7-8) 
The South African entity receiving connected party funding would be required to satisfy SARS 
that an independent lender, taking into account the overall financial position of the entity, would 
have been willing to provide it with the same funding, therefore SARS would require the 
taxpayer to look at the funding from both the lender’s and the borrower’s perspectives (SARS 
2013a:7).   
In order to determine whether the borrowed amount is at arm’s length, the taxpayer would be 
required to provide comparable data (compiled with the assistance of databases, models and 
scorecards to provide a range of industry sector norm ratios, based on credit ratings) which 
SARS can use as a basis to assess the taxpayer’s application of the arm’s length borrowings 
(SARS 2013a:8).  Just as the amount borrowed is required to be at arm’s length, the interest rate 
of the borrowing is also required to be at arm’s length (SARS 2013a:9). 
SARS’ draft Interpretation Note further indicates that in performing risks analysis, SARS will 
consider transactions of greater risk if the Debt:EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortisation) ratio of the South African taxpayer exceeds 3:1 (SARS 
2013a:11).  On the other hand, meeting the requirement is not considered to be a safe harbour 
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and does not guarantee that the loan is considered to be at arm’s length by SARS (SARS 
2013a:12).  
Furthermore, the OECD has noted that if the tax administration can provide safe harbour 
provisions which are to be applied in the relevant circumstances, this can provide taxpayers with 
more certainty and assist in reducing a portion of the time consuming and costly compliance and 
administration burdens (OECD 2013c:9).  The author has noted that SARS has not taken these 
factors into account in drafting the Interpretation Note. 
This draft Interpretation Note has to date not been re-drafted or ratified more than three and half 
years later, hence, it is submitted that certainty and guidance on the determination of arm’s 
length for thin capitalisation purposes has not been provided to taxpayers.  It is further 
submitted that this also provides a possible indication to taxpayers that SARS is not confident in 
the manner in which to accurately determine the arm’s length range for thin capitalisation 
purposes.   
2.4.2. SARS Practice Note 7 
SARS Practice Note 7 was brought into effect in August 1999 and dealt with guidance on 
transfer pricing.    
SARS endorses the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and has indicated that these guidelines 
should be used in interpreting the arm's length principle in South Africa as set out in SARS 
Practice Note 7 (SARS 1999:6).  Practice Note 7 is actually required to be read in conjunction 
with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in order to obtain in-depth guidance on how to 
apply these rules in practice (Joubert et al 2016:2).  Practice Note 7 specifically states that in 
the absence of specific guidance provided in s 31 of the Act, Practice Note 7 or the tax treaties 
entered into by South Africa, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines should be followed (SARS 
1999:6). 
The legislators have not referred to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in s 31 of the Act 
itself.  The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are referred to in Practice Note 7, which is not a 
legally binding document (Davis Tax Committee BEPS Sub-Committee 2014b:16).   
A legally binding general ruling, in terms of s 89 of the Tax Administration Act, should be 
recorded on s 31 of the Act without departing from the OECD guidelines but including 
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principles which reflect the reality of South Africa (Davis Tax Committee BEPS Sub-
Committee 2014b:16-17). 
SARS Practice Note 7 is now 17 years old and has not been updated to keep up with OECD 
developments, even though for several years there have been indications from SARS and 
National Treasury that an updated transfer pricing Interpretation Note is forthcoming (Davis 
Tax Committee BEPS Sub-Committee 2014c:15).  The Interpretation Note is expected to 
replace both Practice Note 2 and Practice Note 7 (Joubert et al 2016:2).  As SARS Practice 
Note 7 is based on the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, it is highly unlikely that the new 
Interpretation Note would fundamentally deviate from Practice Note 7 but it will take into 
consideration the recent OECD changes (Joubert et al 2016:2).  Conversely, the guidance in 
relation to thin capitalisation is expected to be dramatically different from the guidance 
provided in SARS Practice Note 2 (Joubert et al 2016:2). 
2.4.3. Documentation Requirements 
Income tax return 
An important way in which SARS can identify that a taxpayer is transacting with its foreign 
connected party is through check boxes on the income tax return submitted by the South African 
entity.   
Notice for record keeping of transfer pricing documentation 
In December 2015, SARS issued a draft notice which provides for additional record-keeping 
requirements relating to transfer pricing transactions for a company which is a member of a 
group of companies, which has a consolidated South African turnover of at least R1 billion and 
which has entered into transactions with its foreign connected parties (SARS 2015).  In July 
2016, an amended draft notice was issued, changing the threshold from R1 billion to the higher 
of 5% of gross income or R50 million (SARS 2016a:3).  The lower threshold is a great concern, 
as this impacts a much wider range of taxpayers than previously thought who would be required 
to incur costs in order to comply with the transfer pricing record keeping notice (Stelloh 2016).   
The final and approved notice for transfer pricing record keeping was issued on 28 October 
2016 applying to years of assessment commencing on or after 1 October 2016 (SARS 2016b).  
The approved threshold for record keeping is potentially affected transactions which are 
reasonably expected to exceed R100 million, which is still fairly low.  
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Should a South African entity meet the threshold and criteria, it would be required to keep and 
maintain information and documentation as indicated in the final notice (Joubert et al 2016:5).  
With regard to taxpayers falling below this threshold, the guidance is not very clear, as the final 
notice merely indicates that such taxpayers should ‘keep and retain all information and 
documentation necessary’ in order to satisfy SARS that the potentially affected transactions 
were conducted at arm’s length (Joubert et al 2016:5).   
Taxpayers who do not comply with the final notice, by not being in possession of all the 
necessary information and documentation would be in contravention of s 210(2) of the Tax 
Administration Act and a non-compliance penalty will be imposed in addition to any other 
penalties relating to additional transfer pricing assessments (Stelloh 2016), as indicated above in 
part 2.3 of this report.  
2.4.4. Country-by-country reporting 
In December 2016, the Minister of Finance approved South Africa’s ‘regulations specifying the 
country-by-country reporting standard for multinational enterprises’ (SARS 2016c:29).  South 
Africa, as a member of the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project, will be adopting the 
model legislation for country-by-country reporting, as indicated in Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting Action 13 (Joubert et al 2016:5).   
A country-by-country report would be required to be filed, no later than 12 months after the last 
day of the reporting fiscal year (SARS 2016c:Article 5), if the multinational enterprise group’s 
total consolidated group revenue exceeds R10 billion (SARS 2016c:Article 1, para 3). 
Further, in terms of Article 2 where the ‘Ultimate Parent Entity’ is not situated in South Africa, 
a country-by-country report will still be required to be filed by a South African group company 
which forms part of a multinational enterprise if the total consolidated group revenue exceeds 
Euro 750 million (SARS 2016c:Article 1, para 3) and one of the following conditions apply: 
 Where the ultimate parent entity of the multinational enterprise group is not 
obligated to file a country-by-country report in its jurisdiction of tax residence; or 
 The ultimate parent entity’s tax jurisdiction has an international agreement (which 
includes the Multilateral Convention for Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters, any bilateral or multilateral Tax Convention, and any Tax Information 
Exchange Agreement (SARS 2016c:Article 1, para 11))
 
with South Africa but does 
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not have a qualifying Competent Authority Agreement in effect to which South 
Africa is a party at the time of filing the country-by-country report, being 12 months 
after the reporting fiscal year (SARS 2016c:Article 5); or 
 There has been a systemic failure (where automatic exchange of information has 
been suspended or there is a persistent failure to automatically exchange information 
(SARS 2016c:Article 1, para 13)) of the ultimate parent entity’s jurisdiction of tax 
residence that has been notified by SARS to the constituent entity resident for tax 
purposes in South Africa. 
(SARS 2016c:Article 2) 
Where the criteria are met, a country-by-country report is required to be filed for the 
multinational enterprise group in South Africa. 
The OECD guidelines on the country-by-country reporting are discussed in more detail below in 
part 4.3 of this report. 
2.5. Other considerations relating to transfer pricing 
2.5.1. Case law:  In South Africa there has been no reported case involving transfer pricing, 
this could be owing to litigation being a lengthy and costly process coupled with a lack 
of resources available to SARS to deal with these litigations, hence negotiating a 
settlement is a far more attractive option rather than to proceed with litigations 
(Sweidan 2013; Joubert et al 2016:6). 
2.5.2. Personnel:  SARS is required to ensure that the enforcement capacity of its transfer 
pricing division is adequate (Davis Tax Committee BEPS Sub-Committee 2014b:17).  
SARS should also ensure that adequate training is provided to transfer pricing staff and 
that the transfer pricing division increase in size (Davis Tax Committee BEPS Sub-
Committee 2014b:17).  Adequately skilled staffing is essential as transfer pricing 
methods are complex and requires the time and attention of these personnel, more 
especially personnel with accounting or legal education and experience (United Nations 
Department of Economic & Social Affairs 2013:34).  
2.5.3. Exchange of information:  SARS often face difficulties in obtaining information 
relating to the non-resident party to the transaction, thereby creating challenges in 
verifying the calculation of the transfer pricing adjustment (SAIT 2013:3).  SARS does 
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have a wide double tax treaty network which can be used to obtain non-resident 
information in terms of the exchange of information article, however, this treaty 
network does not include some low tax jurisdictions, like Isle of Man (SARS 2016d).  
Furthermore, bilateral tax information exchange agreements were introduced to enable 
tax administrations of two countries to exchange tax information upon request, 
however, to date only 13 agreements have been signed and are in force (SARS 2016e). 
2.5.4. Comparable data:  The traditional transfer pricing methods, as indicated in the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, rely directly on closely comparable data in order to 
perform a transfer pricing analysis (United Nations Department of Economic & Social 
Affairs 2013:33).  Comparable data related to South African companies, and African 
countries, is not generally available because South Africa has limited requirements for 
filing of statutory accounts and this filing is restricted to publically listed companies 
(Deloitte 2015:198).  These filings are often rare and reliance cannot be placed on these 
figures as they include extensive intra-group transactions (Deloitte 2015:198).  
Currently, SARS is making use of international comparables, mainly European data 
because Europe is considered to be the most comparable, of all the locations where such 
databases are available, to the South African market (Deloitte 2015:199; Joubert et al 
2016:3).  SARS has indicated that if another database is utilised for comparability 
purposes, the taxpayer is required to provide appropriate reasons why the other database 
is considered to be more appropriate for the case at hand (Joubert et al 2016:4).  It 
should also be noted that finding comparable data which can be relied on and making 
adjustments to this comparable data for South African purposes (for example, country 
risk adjustments) is not a simple task and is very subjective from both the taxpayer’s 
and SARS’ perspective (United Nations Department of Economic & Social Affairs 
2013:415).  
2.5.5. Advance pricing agreements:  While it was recommended in 1994 by the Katz 
Commission that South Africa should provide advance pricing agreements, this was 
never implemented and is still not available to taxpayers in South Africa (SARS 
2013a:15; Deloitte 2016:236). 
Audit approach:  A South African company will be at risk of being identified for a 
transfer pricing audit by SARS if it transacts with its foreign connected party and 
indicates (by a declaration on the tax return) that it does not have a transfer pricing 
policy document in its possession (Joubert et al 2016:4).  SARS also sends transfer 
pricing questionnaires to taxpayers for risk identification purposes (Joubert et al 
2016:4).  
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2.5.6. Prescription:  In terms of s 99 of the Tax Administration Act, the period of limitation 
of issuing a revised assessment is 3 years from the date of the original assessment.  
SARS does not operate a self-assessment system as yet, but when it does put this system 
in place, the limitation to issue a revised assessment would increase to 5 years (s 
99(1)(b)).  The limitation to issue a revised assessment does not apply in a case where 
the full amount of tax chargeable was not assessed due to fraud, misrepresentation or 
non-disclosure of material facts (s 99(2)(a) and s 99(2)(b)).  SARS and the taxpayer can 
nevertheless extend prescription provided it is agreed upon within the limitation period 
(s 99(2)(c)).  Under s 99(4) of the Tax Administration Act, incorporated by the Tax 
Administration Laws Amendment Act 2015, the Commissioner may, by prior notice to 
the taxpayer of at least 60 days prior to expiry, extend the limitation period by a further 
3 years (in the case of an assessment by SARS) or 2 years (in the case of a self-
assessment) where an audit or investigation relates to, inter alia, the application of the 
doctrine of substance over form or s 31 of the Act.  The reason for the 60 day period is 
to provide the taxpayer with an opportunity to make representations as to why the 
period should not be extended (National Treasury 2015:52).  Section 99(4) is a 
relatively new sub-section and it is yet to be seen how SARS will implement this 
subsection of the Act.  
2.6. Conclusion on South Africa’s transfer pricing legislation and practice 
The following is submitted with regard to South Africa’s transfer pricing legislation and 
practice: 
The substituted South African transfer pricing provisions in s 31 of the Act includes wording 
which is now aligned to the OECD Model Tax Convention, which focuses on the economic 
substance of the arrangements between connected parties, rather than the pricing of specific 
transactions (Brodbeck 2012).  This shift in focus has provided SARS with a much wider scope 
of inspecting and auditing transfer pricing transactions.  
When the transfer pricing legislation was originally suggested, the Katz Commission 
recommended the introduction of legislation to provide taxpayers with the option to enter into 
advance pricing agreements (Katz 1994:233), but this process was never implemented (Deloitte 
2016:236).  SARS should consider introducing advance pricing agreements into the transfer 
pricing legislation which will assist in bringing certainty to taxpayers and foreign multinational 
enterprises.  
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SARS, with the assistance of the OECD, is trying to curb base erosion and profit shifting by 
putting in place country-by-country reporting regulations which was finalised and approved in 
December 2016 (SARS 2016c), but only time will tell whether the country-by-country reporting 
is an effective tool. 
The penalty to be imposed (in terms s 210 and s 211 of the Tax Administration Act) for non-
compliance with documentation retention requirements is, in the author’s view, too low.  A 
higher amount should be imposed on the taxpayer to enforce compliance with documentation 
retention. 
The much talked about Interpretation Note on s 31 should be drafted and released by SARS as 
soon as possible.  This will give SARS the opportunity to update the outdated Practice Note 2, 
the outdated Practice Note 7 (SARS 1999), and to finalise the draft Interpretation Note on thin 
capitalisation (SARS 2013a) as well as provide more appropriate, comprehensive guidance to 
taxpayers based on the updated 2010 OECD guidelines and in addition, incorporate and address 
issues of base erosion and profit shifting. 
SARS should consider moving to a self-assessment system which will assist them in extending 
the original prescription period, in terms of s 99 of the Tax Administration Act, from 3 years to 
5 years.  This will afford SARS additional time to conduct detailed risk assessments and to 
perform more in-depth audits of multinational taxpayers.   
Furthermore, for SARS to ensure that efficient and comprehensive audits are performed within 
the necessary time-frames, it is crucial for SARS to employ an acceptable number of transfer 
pricing staff and provide them with sufficient training in order to enhance their transfer pricing 
knowledge and skill (Davis Tax Committee BEPS Sub-Committee 2014b:17).   
South Africa does not have any case law for transfer pricing purposes (Joubert et al 2016:6).  
SARS should litigate a few transfer pricing cases to confirm transfer pricing principles for 
South African tax purposes.  Alternatively, in terms of s 89 of the Tax Administration Act, at 
least one legally binding general ruling should be issued to confirm the acceptance of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines but include South African based principles (Davis Tax Committee 
BEPS Sub-Committee 2014b:16-17).  
In the next chapter, the transfer pricing legislation and guidance of three selected countries, 
namely Kenya, India and the United Kingdom will be discussed.  
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CHAPTER 3:  Analysis of the transfer pricing legislation and practices of selected 
countries 
This chapter analyses the transfer pricing legislation and practices of three selected countries, 
namely Kenya, India and the United Kingdom in order to provide a basis for comparison to the 
South African transfer pricing legislation.  This comparison will assist in determining whether 
South Africa should still make further improvements to its transfer pricing legislation. 
KENYA 
3.1. Kenya’s transfer pricing legislation 
3.1.1. History 
The Income Tax Act, Chapter 470 (‘Kenyan Income Tax Act’) had a transfer pricing provision 
which was included in s 18(3) of the Kenya Income Tax Act and which required that 
transactions between a foreign connected party and a Kenyan resident taxpayer should be 
conducted at arm’s length, however prior to 2006, there was no guidance which was provided 
by the KRA to determine how the arm’s length principle would be applied in practice (PWC 
2012:169). 
On 1 July 2006, the Kenyan Ministry of Finance was compelled to introduce transfer pricing 
guidelines after they lost a court case, Unilever Kenya Ltd v CoT Income Tax Appeal 753 of 
2003, which involved cross-border transactions with connected persons (Anyanzwa and Olingo 
2015).  The transfer pricing guidance was brought into effect by Legal Notice no.67 of 2006 to 
provide support to the transfer pricing legislation (Deloitte 2016:152; PwC 2012:169). 
3.1.2. Summary of the Kenyan transfer pricing section  
Section 18(3) of the Kenya Income Tax Act, requires that where related parties (one party being 
a resident and the other being a non-resident) transact with each other, the profits of the resident 
company shall be deemed to be the amount that would have accrued if the transaction had been 
conducted by independent persons dealing at arm's length.  
This provision of the Kenyan Income Tax Act is an empowering provision as it provides the 
Commissioner of the KRA with the power to make an adjustment where the transaction is not 
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considered to be in adherence with the arm’s length principle (in other words, to accrue for the 
profits that would have been expected to be earned if the business was dealing with independent 
persons at arm’s length) (Deloitte 2016:152).  There is no provision in the Kenyan Income Tax 
Act which allows for secondary adjustments to be made.  
It is for the taxpayer to prove that they have conducted the transaction in accordance with s 
18(3) of the Kenyan Income Tax Act and in terms of the arm’s length principle (PWC 
2012:171). 
3.1.3. Thin capitalisation provisions 
Thin capitalisation provisions are set out in s 4A(a), s 16(2)(j) and s 16(3) of the Kenyan 
Income Tax Act (PWC 2012:173).  The KRA has imposed a safe harbour of 3:1 debt:equity 
ratio and where there is excessive loan funding, the deemed interest, calculated at the average 
91-day Kenyan Treasury Bill rate, is not deductible for tax purposes (PWC 2012:173). 
3.2. Penalties and interest relating to the transfer pricing provisions 
Additional assessment and interest 
There are no specific penalties which apply in respect of tax arising from the additional 
assessment relating to the transfer pricing adjustment, however, the general penalty provision of 
20% of the principal tax would apply to the additional assessment and late payment interest of 
2% per month would be imposed thereon from the date the tax should have been paid (being 
from four months after the year-end in which the transfer pricing adjustment is made) (Deloitte 
2016:154).  In terms of s 84 of the Tax Procedures Act 29 of 2015 (‘Kenyan Tax Procedures 
Act’), this penalty has remained at 20% (s 84(2)(b)) unless the offence was deliberate in which 
case a penalty of 75% would be imposed (s 84(2)(a)) (PWC 2016:2).  Furthermore, where the 
taxpayer has a second or third underpayment offence, the penalty imposed shall be increased by 
an additional 10% and 25%, respectively (s 84(3)) (PWC 2016:2). 
Prior to 19 January 2016, there was no provision for a reduction in the 20% penalty imposed 
(Deloitte 2016:154).  This has subsequently been amended by the introduction of the Kenyan 
Tax Procedures Act, wherein s 89(6) allows the taxpayer to submit an application in writing 
together with reasons for the remission of the penalty imposed.  With the exception of a penalty 
imposed for tax avoidance, upon consideration and with the approval of the Cabinet Secretary, 
the Commissioner will remit the penalty in whole or in part (s 89(7)).  
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Penalties imposed for non-compliance with documentation requirements 
After the introduction of the Kenyan Tax Procedures Act on 19 January 2016 (PWC 2016:1), in 
terms of s 82 read with s 94, a penalty of 10% of the amount of tax payable will be imposed 
under the tax law to which the document retention failure relates (s 82(1)(a)) alternatively where 
no tax is payable a penalty of 100 000 Kenyan shillings applies (s 82(2)). 
3.3. Kenya’s transfer pricing practice 
3.3.1. Legal Notice no.67 of 2006 (‘the transfer pricing rules’) 
Legal Notice no.67 of 2006, which is part of the legislation, provides the transfer pricing 
guidance for the determination of the arm’s length price and is based on the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines for the use of the most appropriate method (rule 8) of the five available 
OECD methods (rule 7) for determining the arm’s length price (PWC 2012:169;171).  Where 
the taxpayer finds it inappropriate to apply one of these five methods, the Commissioner of the 
KRA would approve an alternative method (rule 7) which is used by the taxpayer (PWC 
2012:170). 
The transfer pricing rules also provide the administrative regulations which include the types of 
records and documentation which is required to be submitted to the Commissioner by a 
taxpayer who is involved in transfer pricing arrangements (Deloitte 2016:153). 
Since the introduction of the transfer pricing rules, there have been no further transfer pricing 
court cases (PWC 2012:171).   
3.3.2. Documentation requirements 
Documentation requirements are set out in the transfer pricing rules (Deloitte 2016:153). 
When a taxpayer claims that they have entered into a transaction with a connected party and the 
application of arm’s length pricing is necessitated, that taxpayer is required to develop and 
maintain, in terms of rule 9(2), documentation such as a suitable transfer pricing policy and the 
necessary documentation to evidence the taxpayer’s analysis, so that the taxpayer’s actual 
business reality is reflected in the documentation (Deloitte 2016:153).  This documentation 
should be available at the time of submission of the tax return (Deloitte 2016:153).  In terms of 
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rule 9(1), upon request, the KRA will provide the taxpayer 14 days within which they are 
required to submit the supporting documentation and the transfer pricing policy to support their 
arm’s length calculation (Deloitte 2016:153).  The KRA has interpreted the provisions in rule 9 
to mean that it is obligatory for a taxpayer to have documentation at hand in readiness if the 
Commissioner requests such documents (PWC 2012:170).  Penalties will be imposed for non-
compliance as indicated above in part 3.2 of this report. 
Other details which are required, at the very least, to be disclosed are as follows: 
 The global organisational structure of the taxpayer;  
 The details of the transaction under review; 
 The transfer pricing policies applied in selecting the appropriate method, the method 
selected and the reasons therefore; 
 The assumptions and strategies used in the application of the transfer pricing 
method; 
 How the method has been applied;  
 The calculations made as well as the price adjustment factors taken into account; and 
 Any other background information as may be required to support the arm’s length 
price calculation. 
(Deloitte 2016:153) 
In 2014, the Kenyan Income Tax Act was amended to require corporate taxpayers to notify the 
KRA within 30 days of any changes in their business structure, especially with regard to 
changes in shareholding, nominee shareholders or beneficial ownership, as well as the sale or 
cessation of the relevant business (Deloitte 2016:153). 
3.3.3. Other considerations relating to transfer pricing 
 Case law: Kenya has one transfer pricing case which forced the introduction of 
guidance on transfer pricing (PWC 2012:172).  The Unilever Kenya Ltd court case is 
discussed in further detail below in part 3.4 of this report.  
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 Personnel:  Within the domestic tax department, the KRA has created a specialised 
transfer pricing division.  The KRA has further invested in their personnel by 
training them locally and abroad in order to provide them with adequate knowledge 
and the necessary skills on advanced transfer pricing issues in order to assist them to 
conduct efficient and effective transfer pricing audits. 
(PWC 2012:172) 
 Exchange of information:  The Kenyan double taxation treaty network is not 
extensive.  It is therefore submitted that their ability to exchange information with 
other tax jurisdictions is limited to the countries with which they have ‘ratified and 
in force’ double taxation agreements. 
(Kenyan Revenue Authority 2016) 
 Comparable information:  The traditional OECD transfer pricing methods are used 
by the KRA for transfer pricing analysis purposes.  Comparable data related to 
Kenyan public companies are only available through published interim and year-end 
reporting while private company information is not available.  For this reason, the 
KRA makes use of international comparables, namely the Orbis database (which 
contains information on over 200 million private companies worldwide) to which it 
subscribes.  Owing to the lack of local comparables in Kenya, the KRA allows its 
taxpayers to rely on global databases such as Amadeus (a database which contains 
comprehensive information on about 21 million companies throughout Europe) and 
Orbis for their benchmarking studies and the KRA also allows for the application of 
country risk adjustments to these international benchmarking studies.  While the 
KRA allows country risk adjustments, they have not provided guidance on the 
country risk adjustments which would be useful for the taxpayers in performing their 
comparability analyses.   
(PWC 2012:172; Deloitte 2016:152) 
 Advance pricing agreements: The KRA does not have advance pricing agreements 
in place as it is hesitant to give binding rulings to a particular taxpayer or particular 
group of taxpayers for KRA’s practices or policies (PWC 2012:172).  
 Audit approach: The KRA has indicated that it regards transfer pricing as possibly 
the main revenue earner, therefore it will have a robust approach when it comes to 
transfer pricing audits, this is further assisted by the wide and vigorous transfer 
pricing rules which are currently in place (PWC 2012:171; Adams & Adams 
2016:4). 
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 Prescription:  The KRA has a self-assessment system in place, thereby affording it 
7 years in which it can audit a taxpayer and raise an additional assessment.  Where 
the KRA identifies fraud, intentional negligence or gross negligence by the taxpayer 
concerned, there is no time limitation imposed on the KRA in which it is required to 
make an additional assessment in respect of a transfer pricing audit. 
(PWC 2012:170) 
3.4. Court case:  Unilever Kenya Ltd v CoT Income Tax Appeal 753 of 2003 
3.4.1. Factual background 
Unilever Kenya Limited (UKL), the appellant, is engaged in the manufacture and sale of a 
variety of household goods.  Unilever plc., incorporated in the United Kingdom, held a 
significant shareholding in UKL.  UKL and Unilever Uganda Limited (UUL), are related 
companies as is required in s 18 of the Kenyan Income Tax Act.  (At 2.) 
The Commissioner of Income Tax, the respondent, raised assessments against UKL in respect 
of the 1995 and 1996 tax years, with regard to the sales made by UKL to UUL on the basis that 
these sales were not at arm’s length prices with the Commissioner relying on the literal meaning 
of the words in s 18(3) of the Kenyan Income Tax Act.  The most important issue was that UKL 
and UUL were connected parties and due to this relationship, the transactions between them 
resulted in less taxable profits than those which would have been earned if the trading 
transactions were done with non-related entities at arm’s length.  (At 2 and 3.) 
The appellant argued that its (UKL’s) internal transfer pricing policy was not binding; however, 
under the circumstances and with the absence of guidance by KRA, the internal transfer pricing 
policy was based on the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (at 5; 9 and 10.).  The cost plus 
return method was used as the most appropriate method with a return on capital employed of 
10% according to UKL’s internal transfer pricing policy and being the return made on sales to 
unrelated parties in the Unilever Group (at 9 and 10.).  In accordance with clause 3 of their 
contract, UKL and UUL applied the cost plus method by providing that the price was to be the 
aggregate of fixed and variable costs incurred by UKL plus a return of 7% (net of tax) on capital 
(at 11.).  The appellant was, therefore, of the view that the calculation was in accordance with 
its transfer pricing policy and must therefore be regarded as an arm’s length price (at 11.). 
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The Respondent argued, inter alia, that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines were not 
applicable to the case as they were not part of the Kenyan law and they are only used for 
guidance on double taxation agreements.  The Respondent further argued that UKL and UUL 
arranged between themselves to fix or set prices of goods between themselves without taking 
into consideration the market forces and this resulted in less taxable profits than those which 
would have been earned if the trading transactions were performed between non-connected 
parties, at arm’s length.  (At 12 and 13.) 
3.4.2. Judgment 
The Judge indicated that the wisdom of taxpayers and tax collectors in other jurisdictions cannot 
be overlooked as ‘[w]e live in… a global village’.  With the absence of any guidelines in Kenya, 
best practice would prevail as it is the best way to develop Kenya’s laws and jurisprudence will 
be enhanced.  The ways of conducting a business have substantially changed over the last 20 
years and it would be incompetent for any court to disregard internationally accepted principles 
of business as long as these do not conflict with Kenyan laws.  The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines ‘are not just there for relaxed reading’.  (At 15 and 16.) 
While the wording of s 18(3) of the Kenyan Income Tax Act is clear and must be read literally 
as it is, there are certain words or sentences which are amenable to more than one interpretation.  
The Indian Income-tax (21
st
 amendment) Rules provide lengthy guidelines in relation to the 
methods which can be used to determine the arm’s length price while s 18(3) of the Kenyan 
Income Tax Act is silent on the methods which can be used or how to prove that the transaction 
is at arm’s length.  This should therefore be a lesson for the KRA to establish rules with regard 
to the determination of arm’s length prices.  (At 16 and 17.) 
The high court was unable to see the ‘arrangement’, as argued by the Respondent, between 
UKL and UUL during the course of business which enabled UKL to make no profit or a 
reduced amount of profit (at 17.).  In the circumstances at hand, UKL did fittingly apply the cost 
plus method to determine the arm’s length price (at 17.).  The court did not uphold the 
Respondents’ argument and consequently allowed the appeal with costs (at 18.) thereby forcing 
the KRA to reverse the assessments raised in terms of s 18(3) of the Kenyan Income Tax Act in 
relation to the 1995 and 1996 years of assessment.   
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3.4.3. Comment on the judgment 
It is submitted that the high court thus endorsed the use of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, being international best practice. 
It is further submitted that while South Africa does place reliance on the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, through Practice Note 7 which is not legally binding, it should consider 
including the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in the Act, thereby placing total reliance on 
these guidelines as this judgment provides confirmation that the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines are international best practice.  
3.5. Conclusion on Kenya’s transfer pricing legislation and practice 
The following is submitted with regard to Kenya’s transfer pricing legislation and practice: 
Whilst the Kenyan Income Tax Act did include transfer pricing provisions which incorporated 
the arm’s length test, it was essential for the KRA to provide guidance for the determination of 
the arm’s length price.  If the KRA did have the necessary guidance in place, there may not have 
been a dispute with Unilever Kenya Ltd.  The transfer pricing rules were drafted to include the 
OECD transfer pricing methodology (further explained below in part 4.2.2 of this report) for the 
purposes of determining the arm’s length price (PWC 2012:169;171).  It is submitted that the 
legislation together with the transfer pricing rules have made the Kenyan transfer pricing 
provisions robust enough to combat the mispricing of foreign connected party transactions.  
The KRA is afforded 7 years to evaluate and identify any risks related to cross-border connected 
party transactions and to conduct an audit on a taxpayer before the assessment prescribes (PWC 
2012:170).  This coupled with the extensive investment in upskilling the transfer pricing 
personnel (PWC 2012:171) empowers the KRA to perform thorough and extensive transfer 
pricing audits. 
The KRA should on the other hand provide detailed guidance on country risk adjustments 
which are required to be made to comparable data in order to assist taxpayers with a more 
accurate determination of an arm’s length price in accordance with the KRA’s expectations 
(PWC 2012:172; Deloitte 2016:152). 
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The KRA should moreover contemplate the introduction of advance pricing agreements (PWC 
2012:172), which could possibly enhance direct foreign investment into Kenya, as they bring 
certainty to foreign entities with regard to transfer pricing concerns.  
 
INDIA 
3.6. India’s transfer pricing legislation 
3.6.1. History 
Indian transfer pricing provisions were first introduced by the Finance Act, 2001 as a separate 
means of reporting and assessing cross-border transactions between connected parties with the 
effective date of 1 April 2001.  The provisions were included in Chapter X ‘Special provisions 
relating to avoidance of tax’ under s 92 to s 92F and s 94A of the Income-tax Act 1961 (‘Indian 
Income-tax Act’) and rules 10A to 10THD of the Indian Income-tax Rules (‘the rules’).  In 
addition, with effect 1 April 2013, the transfer pricing provisions were extended by the 
inclusion of s 92BA to cover specified domestic transactions in a year of assessment between 
two resident taxpayers (Butani 2016:3). 
According to the OECD, India is one of three countries which has emerged as an economic 
giant (OECD 2016a), with one of the fastest growing economies in the world, consequently it is 
vital that India’s transfer pricing regime is investor friendly but on the other hand, the transfer 
pricing regime should be robust enough to combat mischiefs related to transfer pricing (RSM 
India 2016:19). 
According to the African Tax Administration Forum, India has emerged as a benchmark for 
many countries’ transfer pricing provisions as it has one of the most aggressive transfer pricing 
regulations in the world coupled with court case precedent (Spearman 2013; RSM India 
2016:19).  
3.6.2. Summary of the Indian transfer pricing provisions  
India’s transfer pricing legislation is essentially aligned to the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines where the underlying principle is the arm’s length principle with some principles 
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adopted from the United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing 
Countries (Butani 2016:3).  
In terms of s 92 of the Indian Income-tax Act, upon entering into an international transaction or 
specified domestic transaction with an associated enterprise, the income arising from the 
transaction must computed by taking into consideration the arm’s length price. 
That being said, the transfer pricing provisions do not apply in an instance where the arm’s 
length price reduces the taxable income or increases a declared loss of the taxpayer (s 92(3)). If 
this instance does occur, no adjustment can be made (s 92(3)).   
Currently, there is no provision in the Indian Income-tax Act which allows for secondary 
adjustments to be made.  However, with effect from 1 April 2018 a new provision, s 92CE, will 
be included in the Indian Income-tax Act which provides for a secondary adjustment, based on 
certain conditions, when a primary adjustment is made to a transfer price (Government of India, 
Income Tax Department 2017:24). 
Definitions  
The term ‘associated enterprise’ is so widely defined in s 92A (for example, to include an 
enterprise which participates, directly or indirectly or through one or more intermediaries, in the 
management, control or capital of the other enterprise (RSM India 2016:26)), that even 
unrelated parties could be deemed to be associated enterprises (an example being where one 
enterprise provides guarantees not less than 10% of total borrowing of the other enterprise 
(RSM India 2016:27)) and the transfer pricing provisions would be applicable to their 
transaction (Butani 2016:3).  This deeming provision may well, if it has not already, lead to 
numerous disputes for the Indian revenue authority.  
The term ‘international transaction’ is exhaustively defined, in s 92B, and is all-encompassing 
as it includes any ‘arrangement, understanding or action in concert’ pertaining to, inter alia, 
tangible or intangible property, borrowings, services provided and any other transaction which 
affects the profit, loss, or assets of a resident company (RSM India 2016:29).  The term is 
further broadened by the inclusion of a deemed ‘international transaction’ provision (s 92B(2)).   
The term ‘specified domestic transactions’ is defined in s 92BA of the Indian Income-tax Act 
and includes, inter alia, the following transactions: 
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 Expenses incurred by related parties (s 40A(2)(b)); 
 Income and expenditure incurred between different business units of the same 
taxpayer (s 80A, 80IA(8)); and  
 Profits in relation to close corporations (s 80IA(10)).   
and where the aggregate of such specified domestic transactions entered into by the assessee in 
the previous year exceeds a sum of INR 20 crore (200 million Indian Rupees). 
(RSM India 2016:34-35) 
Determination of the arm’s length price 
Where transfer pricing provisions are applicable to transactions, the transactions are required to 
be calculated taking into consideration the arm’s length price; the functions, assets and risks of 
the company; and other economic and commercial factors (RSM India 2016:44). 
In calculating the arm’s length price, there are six methods available to the taxpayer, being the 
five traditional OECD methods and an alternate method/the sixth method
6
 approved by the 
Central Board of Direct Taxes (Butani 2016:10).   
A proviso to s 92C(2) provides taxpayers with a margin of inaccuracy, not exceeding 3%, in the 
calculation of the arm’s length price.  The margin of inaccuracy is 1% for wholesalers and 3% 
for other taxpayers (RSM India 2016:83).   
In addition, in terms of s 92CB, there are safe harbour rules which can, at the option of the 
taxpayer, be applied by certain eligible taxpayers for ‘eligible international transactions’ which 
can be used to determine the arm’s length price.  Further details on the guidance issued for the 
purpose of s 92CB are provided below in part 3.8.1 of this report. 
The burden of proof, for the determination of the arm’s length price with respect to international 
transactions/specified domestic transactions, lies with the taxpayer (RSM India 2016:110).   
 
                                                                                                                                                     
6  The sixth method provides for the mandatory use of publicly quoted commodity prices for certain 
commodity transactions (OECD 2014:7).  This method is not an OECD approved method as in some 
instances it may not be consistent with the arm’s length principle (OECD 2014:7). 
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3.6.3. Thin capitalisation provisions  
Currently, the Indian transfer pricing legislation does not include thin capitalisation provisions.  
While the Indian exchange control guidelines provide specific guidance on external commercial 
borrowings by resident connected parties which automatically approves borrowings if the 
debt:equity ratio is within 4:1, there is no specified thin capitalisation limit for tax purposes.  
With the introduction of general anti-avoidance rules, with effect from April 2017, the foreign 
loan may perhaps be treated as an impermissible arrangement and the revenue authority could 
re-characterise the debt into equity. 
(Butani 2016:2-3) 
With effect from 1 April 2018, it has however been proposed that a new provision, s 94 B, will 
be included in the Indian Income-tax Act which will limit excessive interest paid to non-resident 
associated enterprises, based on certain conditions (Government of India, Income Tax 
Department 2017:24). 
3.7. Penalties and interest relating to the transfer pricing provisions 
The penalties imposed are very stringent and there are penalties for various transfer pricing 
offences.  These penalties are summarised as follows: 
Penalty section 
of the Indian 
Income-tax Act  
Description of the penalty Penalty applicable 
Section 270A 
Will come into 
effect for the 
years of 
assessment 
commencing 1 
April 2017 
(Singhal 2016) 
- Under-reporting  
 
- Misreporting of income 
50% of the amount of tax 
sought to be under-reported. 
200% of the amount of tax 
sought to be misreported. 
This penalty is a fixed 
percentage. 
Section 271(1)(c) 
read with 
explanation 7 to s 
271 
Will be replaced 
by s 270A with 
effect from 1 
April 2017 
Concealment of particulars or furnishing 
inaccuracies related to income.   
 
A minimum of 100% of the 
amount of tax sought to be 
evaded. 
A maximum of 300% of the 
amount of tax sought to be 
evaded. 
This penalty was imposed at 
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(Singhal 2016) the discretion of the Indian tax 
authority (Singhal 2016). 
Section 271AA(1) If the taxpayer 
- Fails to keep and maintain documents 
and information required in terms of s 
92D(1) and s 92D(2); or 
- Fails to report such transactions; or 
- Provides incorrect documents or 
information. 
2% of the value of the 
international transaction/ 
specified domestic transaction 
for each such failure. 
Section 271BA  Failure to provide the accountant’s 
report with Form 3CEB as is required by 
s 92E. 
INR 100 000 
Section 271G  Failure to furnish information or 
documents required under s 92D(3) 
2% of the value of the 
international transaction/ 
specified domestic transaction 
for each such failure. 
Section 
271GB(1), 
271GB(2) and 
271GB(3) 
With effect 1 
April 2017 
(Bilaney 2016) 
Failure to furnish country-by-country 
report 
1 month = INR 5 000 per day 
More than 1 month = INR 
15 000 per day 
Continuing default beyond 
serving a penalty order for 
non-compliance = INR 50 000 
per day 
Section 271GB(4)  
With effect 1 
April 2017 
(Bilaney 2016) 
For country-by-country reporting, if the 
taxpayer: 
- Has knowledge of the inaccuracies; 
- Discovers inaccuracies subsequently;  
and fails to inform the Indian revenue 
authority; 
or 
- Knowingly furnishes inaccurate 
information in response to the Indian 
revenue authority request to check for 
accuracy of the report provided. 
INR 500 000 
(RSM India 2016:111-112) 
In terms of s 246A(q), a taxpayer has the right to appeal against any penalty imposed under any 
provision which falls under chapter XXI of the Indian Income-tax Act (Singhal 2016).  
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Furthermore, in terms of s 274, no penalty may be imposed on a taxpayer without providing the 
taxpayer with an opportunity to put forward their case (Singhal 2016).  
Interest 
Interest is levied on the tax under-paid.  While a request can be made to extend the time to make 
payment of the tax under-paid, the interest is required to be paid within 30 days of the date of 
service of notice of demand.  Furthermore, interest will only be levied on penalties if the 
penalties levied have not been paid within the time-frame specified in the service of notice of 
demand.  
(Deloitte 2016:125) 
3.8. India’s transfer pricing practice  
India’s transfer pricing practices are included in rules 10A to 10THD of the rules. 
3.8.1. Aspects of the transfer pricing legislation covered by the rules (other than 
documentation requirements)  
Determination of arm’s length price 
The methods which can be used to determine the arm’s length price is provided in rule 10B, 
being the five OECD methods or the other method (per s 92C(1)(f) and defined in rule 10AB).  
There is no preferred method which should be used to determine the arm’s length price, but the 
method which is selected should be best suited to the facts and circumstances at hand and 
should provide the most reliable arm’s length price (rule 10C). 
Comparability 
In order to perform a comparability analysis, there are various factors which must be taken into 
account (rule 10B(2)) such as, inter alia, the type of service or goods; the industry; the 
geographical location and market size; the functions performed; the risks assumed; the assets 
employed; and the contractual terms.  The entities will be comparable if there are no differences 
which could materially affect the price in an open market and where there are material 
differences, ‘reasonable adjustments’ should be made to eliminate such differences (rule 
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10B(3)).  The rules do not provide any guidance on such ‘reasonable adjustments’, therefore the 
adjustments are very subjective.   
Computation of the arm’s length price  
Guidance on the computation of the arm’s length price, based on the method selected and the 
comparability analysis performed, is provided in rule 10CA. 
Advance pricing agreements 
Guidance on advance pricing agreements is provided in rules 10F to 10T and rule 44GA.  
Advance pricing agreements are discussed in further detail below in part 3.8.4 of this report. 
Safe harbour rules 
Safe harbours rules were introduced in s 92CB of the Indian Income-tax Act, having a release 
date of 18 September 2013, with the aim of reducing the increasing number of transfer pricing 
audits and the lengthy disputes (RSM India 2016:131).  Guidance on the safe harbour rules is 
provided in rules 10TA to 10TG.  These safe harbours rules are only available to certain 
‘eligible international transactions’ as defined in rule 10TC.  A table for each eligible 
international transaction and the related safe harbour is provided in rule 10TD.  If a taxpayer 
exercises the option to use the rule 10TD safe harbour (for a maximum period of five years), the 
transfer price stated will be accepted as an arm’s length price by the Indian revenue authority.   
3.8.2. Documentation requirements covered by the rules 
Section 92D of the Indian Income-tax Act indicates that every person who has entered into an 
international transaction/specified domestic transaction shall keep and maintain the necessary 
information and documents pertaining to such transaction.  Further guidance on the 
documentation requirements is provided in rule 10D. 
There is a minimum threshold which is required to be met for mandatory record-keeping and 
maintenance of the prescribed information and documents (rule 10D(2)).  In terms of rule 
10D(2), documentation will not be required (but the taxpayer will be required to substantiate, 
with supporting documentation, that the determination of the income arising from international 
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transactions/specified domestic transactions was performed having regard to the arm’s length 
price) if: 
 International transactions:  The aggregate value of the transactions does not exceed 
INR 1 crore (10 million Indian Rupees); or 
 Specified domestic transactions:  The aggregate value of the transactions does not 
exceed INR 20 crore (200 million Indian Rupees). 
The mandatory documentation requirements, which should be available at the time of 
submission of the income tax return, are as follows: 
 A description of the organisational structure and profile of the multinational group, 
including the name, address, legal status and jurisdiction of tax residence of each 
entity, shareholding details within the group, and other ownership interest held by 
other entities; 
 A general description of the taxpayer’s and associated enterprise’s business, as well 
as an industry analysis; 
 A comprehensive description of the nature and the terms of the international 
transactions/specified domestic transactions entered into; 
 A detailed analysis of the functions performed, the assets utilised and the risks borne 
by each party involved in the transactions; 
 Any economic analysis, market analysis, forecasts, budgets or any other financial 
estimates prepared by the taxpayer; 
 A list of uncontrolled transactions taken into account for analysing their 
comparability with the international transactions/specified domestic transactions; 
 Analyses performed to evaluate comparability of uncontrolled transaction with the 
relevant international transactions/specified domestic transactions; 
 A description of the methods which were considered, the method selected, reasons 
for the selection and how the method was applied for the determination of the arm’s 
length price in relation to the relevant international transactions/specified domestic 
transactions;  
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 Details of the workings performed, comparable data and other financial data used, 
adjustments made with reasons, the assumptions, the policies, the negotiations and 
any other factors which were considered in the determination of the arm’s length 
price; and 
 Any other information, data or document, relating to the taxpayer or associated 
enterprise which may be pertinent for the determination of the arm’s length price. 
(Rule 10D(5)) 
This information and documentation is required in terms of rule 10D(5) to be kept and 
maintained by the taxpayer for a period of 8 years from the end of the year of assessment. 
3.8.3. Country-by-country reporting 
India being a member of the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project, has adopted the 
model legislation, three tiered approach, related to country-by-country reporting.  This was done 
by the insertion of s 286 in the Indian Income-tax Act by the Finance Bill 2016 with an effective 
date of 1 April 2017.  The country-by-country reporting is required for every parent entity or 
alternate reporting entity, which is an Indian resident, with consolidated revenue for the 
previous year exceeding the equivalent of Euro 750 million in Indian Rupees as indicated in the 
Memorandum to the Finance Bill 2016.  
(Government of India, Income Tax Department 2016a:24-26). 
No guidance relating to the country-by-country reporting has been issued by the Indian revenue 
authority to date (Bilaney 2016). 
3.8.4. Other considerations relating to transfer pricing 
 Case law:  There have been many Indian court judgments which have been the 
cause of changes in the Indian transfer pricing legislation.  An example being, CIT v 
Glaxo SmithKline Asia (P) Ltd (2010) 236 CTR (SC) 113 (discussed in part 3.9 of 
this report) after which the transfer pricing legislation was changed to include 
‘specified domestic transactions’ (RSM India 2016:34).  The transfer pricing 
division in the Indian revenue authority has a large volume of litigation cases 
compared to other areas of audit, with many still awaiting a hearing in the courts 
(Bhatnagar 2016). 
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 Personnel:  The building of transfer pricing capacity in India is mainly by providing 
on the job training, engaging with the training academy to assist with specialised 
training, providing seminars and conferences to assist with the sharing of knowledge 
and experiences by transfer pricing officers engaged in transfer pricing audits.  The 
transfer pricing division had to grow in size due to the increasing number of cases 
referred to audit.   
(United Nations Department of Economic & Social Affairs 2013:111-112) 
 Exchange of information:  India does have a wide double tax treaty network which 
can be used to obtain non-resident information in terms of the exchange of 
information article, however, this treaty network does not include some low tax 
jurisdictions, like Switzerland (Government of India, Income Tax Department 
2016b).  Furthermore, India does have bilateral tax information exchange 
agreements which were introduced to enable tax administrations of two countries to 
exchange tax information upon request (Government of India, Income Tax 
Department 2016b). 
Where India does not have an effective exchange of information with certain 
countries, that country is declared as a ‘notified jurisdictional area’.  Section 94A of 
the Indian Income-tax Act states that where an Indian taxpayer transacts with a 
person located in a ‘notified jurisdictional area’ (as specified by the Central 
Government by way of Official Gazette), that person will be deemed to be an 
‘associated enterprise’ and any transaction between these parties will deemed to be 
an ‘international transaction’ (RSM India 2016:33).  As such, the deemed 
international transaction will be subject to the Indian transfer pricing provisions as 
well as all compliance requirements, including the maintenance of documents as 
required under transfer pricing provisions but the person will not be entitled to the 
benefit of the second proviso to s 92C(2) being the application of the allowed 
percentage variation for the determination of the arm’s length price (RSM India 
2016:33).  To date, only Cyprus is a ‘notified jurisdictional area’ (RSM India 
2016:33).  It is submitted that the concept of ‘notified jurisdictional area’ is a 
concept unique to India.   
Comparable information:  Indian databases, which the Indian tax authority relies 
on for comparability purposes, contain vital data of more than 30 000 companies.  
These databases are Prowess (which contains financial information of Indian 
companies from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy), Capitaline Plus (which 
contains fundamental market data on Indian listed, unlisted and subsidiary 
companies) and ACE TP (which is an Indian business database application for the 
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comparison of company financial information for transfer pricing purposes).  The 
foreign databases are not utilised by the Indian taxpayers as they will not be 
comparable to Indian companies or they do not have Indian company financial 
information.  In relation to adjustments which are made to the comparability 
analysis, rule 10B(3) does not provide ample guidance, nevertheless, the Indian 
courts have consistently been of the view that adjustments must be passed for 
differences in, inter alia, working capital, risk identification, growth and personnel 
dimensions of the company concerned so as to enhance the reliability of the results. 
(RSM India 2016:91-92; 95-96) 
 Advance pricing agreements:  Advance pricing agreements provisions (s 92CC and 
s 92CD) were introduced, in July 2012 and became effective on 30 August 2012, in 
order to reduce the number of disputes and to provide taxpayers with tax certainty on 
the determination of the arm’s length price.  When a taxpayer enters into an advance 
pricing agreement with the Commissioner (and the Income-tax authority 
subordinated to him), they mutually agree on the determination of the arm’s length 
price by prescribing the transfer pricing methodology and any critical assumptions 
(in other words, the most critical factors and assumptions used in the agreement) 
relating to that specific international transaction, for a specific period. 
(RSM India 2016:137)   
The maximum validity period of each advance pricing agreement is five consecutive 
years with the option to ‘roll back’ the agreement to four previous years of 
assessment (s 92CC(9A) introduced in 2014).  In addition, the advance pricing 
agreement will not be binding if there is a change in the critical assumptions or a 
there is a failure to meet the conditions on which the agreement was based (rule 
10M).  Advance pricing agreements are not applicable to specified domestic 
transactions (RSM India 2016:43).   
The process to be followed for an advance pricing agreement is provided in rule 
10H, rule 10-I and rules 10-O to 10S of the rules.  
 Audit approach:  Transfer pricing audits are usually risk based audits which are 
triggered, in most circumstances, by the deduction of expenses relating to royalty or 
technical fees; advertising, marketing or promotional overheads paid to a foreign 
entity; management services fees; and loans (Bhatnagar 2016). 
 Prescription:  As of 1 June 2016, in terms of s 153 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 
the time to complete a transfer pricing audit is 33 months (2 years and 9 months) 
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from the date of submission of a return by the taxpayer which is generally submitted 
a year after the end of the financial year (31 March for all companies in India) (RSM 
India 2016:115).   
3.9. Court case:  CIT v Glaxo SmithKline Asia (P) Ltd (2010) 236 CTR (SC) 113 
3.9.1. Factual background  
Glaxo SmithKline Asia (P) Ltd (‘GSKA’) had only one employee being the company secretary, 
and was engaged in the manufacture and sale of fast-moving consumer products.  Glaxo Smith 
Kline Consumer Healthcare Ltd (‘GSKCH’) provided administrative services to GSKA, which 
included, inter alia, marketing, finance, human resource and secretarial services.  Both GSKA 
and GSKCH were Indian residents.  According to the agreement between GSKA and GSKCH, 
GSKA would reimburse GSKCH for providing various services at cost plus 5%, the ‘cross 
charges’.  Since the said agreement did not prescribe the basis for allocation of costs incurred 
for the various services provided to GSKA, the assessing officer believed that the payment of 
cross charge to GSKCH could not be justified and was not fully and exclusively for GSKA’s 
business purposes.  The assessing officer was of the view that the payment of cross charges to 
the extent of 7% of net sales was reasonable and disallowed the balance.  The Commissioner of 
Income Tax upheld the assessment of the assessing officer on appeal.  The same approach was 
adopted by the assessing officer for the subsequent assessment years. 
(Bilaney 2011) 
The matter proceeded to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal where it was held that the matter 
did not fall within the scope of s 40A(2) (which deals with the disallowance of excessive and 
unreasonable expenditure) as the entities (GSKA and GSKCH) were not considered to be 
related parties in terms of the said section and therefore it was held that the assessment raised 
was invalid.  The Indian tax authority thereafter filed an appeal to the High Court which also 
dismissed the case on the same basis as the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.   
(Bilaney 2011) 
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3.9.2. Judgment 
While in the case of domestic transactions, the under declaration of sales and over declaration of 
expenses will lead to a neutral ground for income tax purposes, there are two circumstances 
where tax arbitrage could occur between related parties, which are as follows: 
 Where one entity is loss making and the other is profit making and revenue is shifted 
into the loss making entity; and 
 The entities are taxed at different rates of tax due to, inter alia, different tax statuses, 
area specific incentives and the nature of the business;  
then the revenue will be diverted to the entity with the lower tax rate thereby causing a loss in 
revenue to the Indian fiscus.  (At 2.) 
For this reason, the court recommended to the Central Board of Direct Taxes that an 
investigation into the matter should be performed to determine whether the transfer pricing 
provisions should be applied to domestic transactions between related parties for the purposes of 
s 40A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act (at 2.).  The Judge indicated that the Supreme Court does 
not normally provide recommendations, however, with the aim of reducing complex future 
litigations, the court advised that s 40A(2) and s 80IA(10) (disallowance of ‘super normal’ 
profits) should be amended to allow the Indian tax authority to make adjustments, utilising the 
transfer pricing provision principles, to resident related party transactions which are not 
considered to be at fair market value (at 3.).  In addition, the compulsory documentation 
requirements and an accountant’s report, as set out in rule 10D and rule 10E, should be 
extended to include domestic related party transactions (at 3.).  
Based on the facts at hand, the special leave petition filed by the Indian tax authority was 
dismissed by the Supreme Court as GSKA and GSKCH were not considered to be related 
parties in terms of s 40A(2) and further the transaction entered into was a ‘revenue neutral 
exercise’ (at 2.).  
3.9.3. Comments on the judgment 
The transfer pricing provisions were amended with effect from 1 April 2012 to include 
‘specified domestic transactions’ (as indicated above in point 3.5.3 of this report) under the 
transfer pricing provisions.  It is submitted that the Indian tax authority therefore responded 
swiftly to this loophole identified in the legislation and the recommendations made by the 
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Supreme Court.  It is further submitted that while the introduction of ‘specified domestic 
transaction’ provisions may have caused costly tax compliance burdens for the local taxpayers, 
it assists in curbing the tax arbitrage for the Indian tax authority.  
It is submitted that, for South African purposes, there may be provisions in the Act which could 
possibly be used to curb this tax arbitrage, such as the ‘in the production of income test’ in s 
11(a) that can be applied to certain expenditure that is excessive as a result of it not being 
market related (Haupt 2016:139); s 20A providing that the assessed loss of certain trades should 
be ring-fenced; s 103(2) which disallows the utilisation of assessed losses when there is a 
change in shareholding of the entity or an agreement which results in income in the said entity; 
or s 80A being the general anti-avoidance provision.  Further research should be performed on 
this aspect within South Africa to determine whether this arbitrage is occurring and whether 
there is a need to introduce such domestic transfer pricing legislation. 
3.10. Conclusion on India’s transfer pricing legislation and practice 
The following is submitted with regard to India’s transfer pricing legislation and practice: 
The Indian transfer pricing legislation, which is to a large extent based on the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, is robust and complex (Butani 2016:3; RSM India 2016:19).  Taxpayers 
need to ensure that they have calculated the arm’s length price accurately by using the most 
appropriate method and disclosed all relevant information on the required forms otherwise 
substantial penalties apply (RSM India 2016:111-112).   
On a yearly basis there are amendments made to the transfer pricing provisions or rules, 
therefore taxpayers need to keep abreast of the latest developments to the transfer pricing 
provisions in the Indian Income-tax Act (RSM India 2016:2-8).  Furthermore, as there are many 
Indian litigations, due to the aggressive nature of the transfer pricing provisions (RSM India 
2016:19), once these court cases are finalised, more amendments may occur to curb mischiefs 
surrounding related party transactions, as can be seen from the court case discussed above in 
part 3.9 of this report.  That being said, court cases create precedent which enforces and 
confirms transfer pricing principles for the Indian tax authority which is invaluable for future 
audits.  
Advance pricing agreements, safe harbour rules and the allowable margin of inaccuracy are 
ideal tools to reduce the number of transfer pricing litigations for the Indian revenue authority 
and provide certainty to both local and foreign taxpayers (RSM India 2016:81;131;137).  With 
respect to the advance pricing agreements the only downside for the taxpayer is that there is a 
45 
 
fee which is required to be paid whereas in many other jurisdictions no fee is required (RSM 
India 2016:144-146).  The roll back of the advance pricing agreements will also benefit 
taxpayers who have incorrectly calculated their arm’s length prices in prior years (RSM India 
2016:142). 
India currently does not have thin capitalisation provisions which can assist in protecting its tax 
base from excessive interest deductions.  However, a proposal has been made to include such 
provisions with effect from 1 April 2018 (Government of India, Income Tax Department 
2017:24). 
 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
3.11. The United Kingdom’s transfer pricing legislation 
3.11.1. History 
The United Kingdom, being an OECD member country, follows the OECD’s Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines (HM Revenue & Customs 2013).  The current United Kingdom transfer pricing rules 
are included in Part 4, being transfer pricing, and Part 5, being advance pricing agreements, of 
the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 (‘TIOPA’) (Slaughter and May 
2015:1).  TIOPA contains a redraft of the previous transfer pricing rules which were contained 
in Schedule 28AA (as amended) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 and which was 
in effect for accounting periods ending on or after 1 July 1999 (PWC 2014:792). 
3.11.2. Summary of the United Kingdom’s transfer pricing provisions  
The United Kingdom transfer pricing provisions are based on the arm’s length principle (as 
provided in chapter 1 of Part 4 of the TIOPA) and requires that where there is a ‘provision’, 
which is created by a ‘transaction’ or a ‘series of transactions’, between two ‘affected persons’ 
(who share a direct or indirect control relationship, as defined), ‘the arm’s length provision’ 
must be substituted for ‘the actual provision’ in the case where there is a difference between the 
actual provision and the arm’s length provision; and that difference gives rise to a tax benefit for 
either of the persons (Casley 2016:3).  This substitution of the arm’s length provision for the 
actual provision gives rise to a transfer pricing adjustment, which can only be an upward 
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adjustment, in other words, only an increase in taxable income or a decrease in a tax loss 
(Casley 2016:4).  These transfer pricing provisions are very wide and apply to both cross-border 
transactions and to domestic transactions (PWC 2014:793).  Where a transfer pricing adjustment 
arises, HMRC does not make any secondary adjustments (such as deemed dividends or deemed 
loans) as there is no provision in the United Kingdom law for such adjustments (PWC 
2014:795). 
The OECD transfer pricing guidelines and any subsequent amendments are specifically 
included in the United Kingdom’s legislation by s 164 of the TIOPA. It further indicates that the 
United Kingdom transfer pricing legislation must be interpreted in such a way that it does not 
deviate from these guidelines.   
The United Kingdom has mechanisms in place to provide relief in the form of compensating 
adjustments to taxpayers who are affected by transfer pricing adjustments (Casley 2016:5). 
There is also an exemption, in terms of s 166 of the TIOPA, from the application of the transfer 
pricing provisions which applies to most small (no more than 50 staff and either an annual 
turnover or balance sheet total of less than Euro10 million) and medium sized enterprises (no 
more than 250 staff and either an annual turnover of less than Euro 50 million or a balance sheet 
total of less than Euro 43 million) (HMRC 2016c:INTM412070). 
The burden of proof relating to the compliance with the transfer pricing provisions rests with the 
taxpayer upon submitting the tax return (Casley 2016:50).   
3.11.3. Thin capitalisation provisions  
Prior to 1 April 2004, thin capitalisation was a separate component from the transfer pricing 
legislation.  The thin capitalisation provisions are now included in the transfer pricing 
provisions and are based on the arm’s length principle which enables HMRC to disallow 
excessive interest paid as a tax deduction by a United Kingdom company on a loan from a 
related party.   
(PWC 2014:812) 
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There is no formal safe harbour, however, for risk identification purposes, HMRC’s historical 
data has provided that a debt:equity ratio of 1:1 and an interest cover of 3:1 may be considered 
to be ‘safe’.  It should be noted that these safe harbours could vary between industries.   
(PWC 2014:812) 
To provide certitude to a financing transaction, a taxpayer can apply for an advance thin 
capitalisation agreement under Part 5 of the TIOPA.  The same provisions which apply to 
normal advance pricing agreements, apply to thin capitalisation agreements.   
(PWC 2014:810-811) 
3.12. Penalties and interest relating to the transfer pricing provisions  
Guidance on penalties is included in the Compliance Handbook, CH81000 (penalties for 
inaccuracies) and CH400000 (charging penalties) (HMRC 2016a) and the Enquiry Manual, 
EM4500 (HMRC 2016b). 
There is no specific transfer pricing penalty provision which can be applied to transfer pricing 
adjustments made by HMRC, therefore the general penalty provisions, as indicated below, 
would apply (PWC 2014:803).  
Failure to keep or preserve adequate records 
A penalty of up to GBP 3 000 may be charged for each failure to keep or preserve adequate 
records and there can only be one failure for each return or claim (HMRC 2016b:EM4650).  No 
penalty shall be imposed merely due to the fact that the information was not available in the 
appropriate format (Casley 2016:49). 
Careless or deliberate error 
Where there is an adjustment required due to a potential loss in revenue, a penalty of between 
0% and 100% of the potential lost revenue will be levied.  These tax geared penalties will be 
levied in the following instances: 
48 
 
 An understatement in the tax liability by the inclusion of inaccurate information 
through an overstatement of a loss or an overstated claim to repayment of tax; and 
 The inaccuracy is as a result of carelessness or failure to take reasonable care 
(HMRC 2016a:CH81140).  Where the taxpayer can show that they made a 
reasonable attempt to comply, this cannot be considered to be carelessness.  It is 
possible that where a transfer pricing audit adjustment is made, an inaccuracy 
penalty could apply.  The maximum penalty for this type of inaccuracy is 30% of 
potential loss in revenue; or 
 The inaccuracy is deliberate.  In this instance, the taxpayer must have had knowledge 
of the inaccuracy in the return.  The maximum penalty for this type of deliberate 
inaccuracy is 70% of potential loss in revenue where it was not concealed or 100% 
of potential loss in revenue where it was concealed (for example, inter alia, 
destroying supporting documents, falsifying documents and back-dating documents). 
(Casley 2016:48-49) 
Further guidance is provided in CH72540 (HMRC 2016a). 
Failure to comply with an information notice 
Where an enquiry is made with a taxpayer, the said taxpayer could appeal against the 
information notice or elements of the notice by approaching the tax tribunal.  However, where 
no appeal is made by the taxpayer and the taxpayer fails to submit the requested information, 
penalties of up to GBP 60 per day may be charged for each day of such failure.  
(Casley 2016:55) 
Fraudulently or negligently providing information  
A penalty of up to GBP 10 000 is imposed on a taxpayer for fraudulently or negligently 
providing false or misleading information in connection with an advance pricing agreement or 
an advance thin capitalisation agreement (s 227 of the TIOPA; Casley 2016:62). 
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Reduction in penalties 
Where the taxpayer identifies the error and informs HMRC prior to HMRC identifying the 
error, alternatively, where the taxpayer is highly co-operative with HMRC during the audit 
process, the penalty imposed could possibly be reduced (Casley 2016:48). 
Interest 
HMRC generally charges interest on taxes which have been underpaid, as would be in the case 
of a transfer pricing audit adjustment, and it is calculated from the original due date of the said 
tax (PWC 2014:803). 
3.13. The United Kingdom’s transfer pricing practice 
3.13.1. The Manuals 
HMRC prepares and maintains a series of manuals (which are updated periodically) to provide 
guidance to its tax inspectors (collectively known as the HMRC Manual) but these manuals are 
published in redacted form for taxpayers and their advisors to consult  (Casley 2016:4).  The 
reason for the redactions is that the HMRC Manual is not law, it is not binding and cannot be 
used in court (Casley 2016:4).  On the other hand, where a taxpayer deviates from the manuals, 
disclosure is essential (Casley 2016:4).  Overall, these manuals provide HMRC’s interpretation 
of the existing legislation, the rationale behind the legislation and explanations of transfer 
pricing developments (PWC 2014:796).   
The transfer pricing guidance is mainly included in the comprehensive International Manual 
(HMRC 2016c) (Casley 2016:4).  The International Manual contains guidance on, inter alia, 
transfer pricing legislation and principles, transfer pricing methodology, types of transactions, 
business structures, operational guidance, intra-group funding and thin capitalisation.  The key 
transfer pricing aspects of the International Manual are as follows: 
 The terms ‘provision’ and ‘transactions’ are defined (HMRC 2016c:INTM412050).  
The term ‘provision’ refers to all the terms and conditions attached to the transaction 
or series of transactions and the term ‘transaction’ refers to arrangements, 
understandings and mutual practices (whether legally enforceable or not) (HMRC 
2016c:INTM412050).  It is therefore submitted that the meaning of the word 
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provision and transaction is very wide and all-encompassing.  These terms are also 
dealt with in the United Kingdom court case discussed below in part 3.14 of this 
report.  The term ‘series of transactions’ is also defined (HMRC 
2016c:INTM440190).   
 The five traditional methods as per the OECD guidelines are available to be used by 
taxpayers in the United Kingdom (HMRC 2016c:INTM421010).  With the 
introduction of the 2010 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, there is no preferred 
method for comparability purposes, that being said, where there are two equally 
reliable methods, one of which is the comparable uncontrolled price method, then 
the comparable uncontrolled price method will be used as it is the simplest and best 
method to use (Casley 2016:14).  Additionally, HMRC usually considers that within 
the business itself, a comparable transaction may exist with an independent party 
which would be the best source of information for comparability purposes (HMRC 
2016c:INTM421030; Casley 2016:11).  
 Guidance is provided on various types of transactions. Examples of these types of 
transactions are, the sale of physical goods (HMRC 2016c:INTM440020) and 
services provided (HMRC 2016c:INTM440060 to INTM440080).  The guidance 
also gives consideration to the circumstances in which a provision may be set aside 
and replaced with something different, in other words, what would have happened 
between independent parties (HMRC 2016c:INTM440010/INTM440200). 
 With multinational enterprises increasing their operations on a global basis, inter-
company cross-border transactions rise with improved communications and 
distribution channels which could cause potential incidences of inappropriate pricing 
(HMRC 2016c:INTM441010).  Guidance is provided to audit teams on commonly 
known business and legal structures which multinational enterprises use to drive 
down their effective tax rate by making use of cross-border transactions (such as, 
inter alia, royalties, commission, service fees), where tax may be a motivating factor 
for such a structure (HMRC 2016c:INTM441010).   
 Operational guidance is provided on governance of transfer pricing (HMRC 
2016c:INTM481000); which includes the risk assessment process and key focus 
areas for risk identification purposes (HMRC 2016c:INTM482000); guidance on 
practical and compliance issues involved in a transfer pricing case (HMRC 
2016c:INTM483000); assistance in evaluating transfer pricing reports (HMRC 
2016c:INTM484000); and practical guidance on how to establish the transfer price, 
including how to find and use comparables (HMRC 2016c:INTM485000):   
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 Guidance is provided to audit teams on intra-group funding, from the provisions of 
the legislation and case law to potential taxpayer arguments upon adjusting the 
interest to an arm’s length amount (HMRC 2016c:INTM500000).  
 The United Kingdom approach to thin capitalisation (included in Part 4 of the 
TIOPA) is to apply the arm’s length principle to lending and borrowing transactions, 
treating the parties to the transaction as if they were independent, as per the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines (HMRC 2016c:INTM511010).  Since March 2007, the 
only way a corporate taxpayer can obtain certainty for the application of the thin 
capitalisation legislation is by an advance thin capitalisation agreement made under 
the advance pricing agreement legislation, as contained in part 5 of the TIOPA 
(HMRC 2016c:INTM512010).  The guidance relating to thin capitalisation is 
intended for technically trained HMRC personnel, while providing tax advisors with 
insight into the advance thin capitalisation agreement processes and offers 
transparency on HMRC’s approach to financial transfer pricing issues and the related 
audit (HMRC 2016c:INTM511010). 
3.13.2. Documentation requirements 
There is no specific rule in Chapter 4 of the TIOPA which requires the preparation of transfer 
pricing documentation.  Taxpayers are therefore required to interpret the general record keeping 
requirements in relation to transfer pricing for which HMRC looks to the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines for guidance.  As the United Kingdom has a self-assessment system in place, 
where the taxpayer submits a return, the taxpayer asserts that the return is considered to be 
correct and complete even with regard to the transfer pricing provisions and the arm’s length 
position taken. 
(Casley 2016:45) 
HMRC is of the view that the following records are not required to be submitted but should be 
maintained, in any format, for a period of 4 years: 
 The accounting records, providing income and expenditure book entry details of the 
relevant transfer pricing transaction together with supporting documentation.  This 
documentation should be in existence at the time of submission of the income tax 
return.  This requirement is imposed in order to determine the actual ‘provision’; 
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 Records detailing the related party transaction or series of transactions to which the 
transfer pricing rules apply, including their nature, the terms and conditions, and the 
prices relating to the transaction.  This documentation should be in existence at the 
time of submission of the income tax return.  This requirement is imposed in order to 
illustrate the actual ‘provision’ and the direct or indirect control relationship of the 
‘affected persons’; 
 Supporting evidence (the extent of which will depend on the nature and complexity 
of the transaction) that the arm’s length provision has been met.  The supporting 
evidence would include, inter alia, the transfer pricing method elected and reasons 
therefore, the comparable data used and any adjustments made.  This requirement is 
imposed in order to illustrate the ‘arm’s length provision’; and 
 Records of the calculations or evaluations performed in arriving at any tax 
adjustment which was included in the tax return for the purposes of the transfer 
pricing provisions.  This documentation should be in existence at the time of 
submission of the income tax return. 
(Casley 2016:45-47) 
3.13.3. Country-by-country reporting 
As the United Kingdom is a member of the OECD and the OECD Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting project, any recommendations put forward by the OECD will be considered by the 
HMRC.  The United Kingdom has therefore adopted the model legislation, three tiered 
approach, related to country-by-country reporting with effect from 1 January 2016 with the first 
country-by-country report due in 2017 (12 months after year-end) (Casley 2016:47). 
The first step taken in implementing country-by-country reporting was that 31 countries, 
including the United Kingdom, signed an agreement to exchange reports from 2017 (Casley 
2016:47).  With this agreement in place, tax jurisdictions will automatically exchange the 
country-by-country reports with each other in the countries in which the relevant enterprise 
operates, provided that the country-by-country reporting has also been introduced in that tax 
jurisdiction (Casley 2016:47). 
Where a taxpayer fails to submit the country-by-country report, penalties may apply (Casley 
2016:47). 
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3.13.4.  Other considerations relating to transfer pricing 
 Case law:  As there are inherent uncertainties in establishing an arm’s length price, 
transfer pricing enquiries are in most instances settled by negotiation (Casley 
2016:55).  However, HMRC is now more willing to address transfer pricing risks by 
following the litigation process in order to obtain case authority and provide clarity 
on transfer pricing provisions (Casley 2016:55).  In 2009, the first United Kingdom 
case (DSG Retail Ltd v HMRC) was heard where issues of the applicability of the 
most appropriate transfer pricing methodology and the application of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines was dealt with fully (PWC 2014:798).  This case is 
discussed below in part 3.14 of this report. 
 Personnel:  In 2008, the HMRC established a dedicated transfer pricing unit to 
provide expert resources to identify and address transfer pricing risks (HM Revenue 
& Customs 2013).  The unit has grown to 60 personnel who are positioned all over 
the United Kingdom (Casley 2016:51). 
 Exchange of information:  HMRC does not have the power to obtain information 
directly from taxpayers who are not United Kingdom residents.  The United 
Kingdom, however, does have an extensive double tax treaty network which can 
assist in the request for such non-resident information under the exchange of 
information article. 
(PWC 2014:802) 
 Comparable information:  HMRC has preference for its own United Kingdom 
sourced comparable data for activities based in the United Kingdom, however, 
generally HMRC does allow the use of European data for comparability purposes 
(Casley 2016:11).  Similarly if comparable data is required for an enterprise outside 
of the United Kingdom, the data relating to that geographical area would be more 
appropriate to use (Casley 2016:11).  HMRC makes use of commercial databases, 
inter alia, Orbis and Amadeus databases published by Bureau van Dijk (Casley 
2016:12).  Comparability adjustments, the most common adjustment being working 
capital adjustments, should be made if the quality of the results will be improved and 
the adjustment will change the range of the results (Casley 2016:12-13).  If the 
results fall within the arm’s length range of prices, then no adjustment is required, 
conversely, if the results fall outside the acceptable range then HMRC must revise 
the taxpayer’s tax computation so as to replace the actual price with the arm’s length 
price (INTM485120).   
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 Advance pricing agreements:  Legislation relating to advance pricing agreements 
(unilateral, bilateral or multilateral) is provided in Part 5 (s 218 to s 230) of the 
TIOPA and guidance provided in a Statement of Practice SP2/10 (HMRC 2016d).  
As the resources available to perform work on advance pricing agreements are 
limited, HMRC generally only accepts applications for more complex transfer 
pricing issues (being, inter alia, a specific issue, a specific transaction or all of the 
taxpayer’s entire transfer pricing arrangements) or in cases where double taxation is 
likely to occur if no advance pricing agreement is in place (Casley 2016:60).  The 
typical period of an advance pricing agreement is three to five years (HMRC 
2016d:para 25) and a condition is included in the agreement whereby an ‘annual 
report’ is required to be submitted by the taxpayer with the tax return to demonstrate 
that they have complied with the advance pricing agreement (HMRC 2016d:para 
36).  HMRC does not impose a fee for an advance pricing agreement application 
(Casley 2016:61).  The advance pricing agreement may be withdrawn at any time 
prior to the conclusion of the formal agreement, thereafter it cannot be withdrawn 
unless it is nullified (as a result of the information provided by the taxpayer being 
false or misleading), revoked (non-compliance by the taxpayer or the conclusion of 
the ‘conditions having effect’) or revised (where there is a change in circumstances) 
(Casley 2016:61-62).   
 Audit approach:  For risk assessment purposes, HMRC will review documents on 
hand or have an informal meeting with the taxpayer to justify the opening of a 
transfer pricing enquiry and to determine whether the case should be pursued taking 
into consideration the resources required to be deployed and the perceived results 
relating to the transfer pricing risks.  A framework has been designed by HMRC to 
facilitate an effective transfer pricing enquiry process.  The target is to resolve all 
enquiries (except for complex enquiries) within 18 months and to increase the value 
of transfer pricing adjustments.  With more complex enquiries HMRC intends 
resolving the enquiry or taking the case to litigation within 36 months. 
(Casley 2016:52) 
 Prescription:  In most cases, HMRC has 12 months after the taxpayer has submitted 
a return to open an enquiry (start an audit), once the enquiry is sent, there is no time 
restriction on when the enquiry should be closed except if the taxpayer is of the view 
that HMRC is excessively prolonging the closure of the enquiry then they will 
request the tax tribunal to direct HMRC to issue a closure notice (finalisation of 
audit) (Slaughter and May 2015:6).  Effective 1 April 2010, without opening an 
enquiry, a discovery assessment can be made up to 4 years after submission of the 
return, where HMRC discovers something that it ‘could not have been reasonably 
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expected ... to be aware of’ on the basis of the information made available at the time 
of submission of the tax return (Casley 2016:51).  This 4 year period can be 
extended up to 6 years and 20 years if it was found that the taxpayer made a careless 
or deliberate error, respectively, in the transfer pricing calculation (Slaughter and 
May 2015:6). 
3.14. Court case:  DSG Retail Ltd v HMRC (2009) UK FTT 31 (TC) 1 
3.14.1. Factual background 
The case involved DSG Retail Limited (‘DSG’) which is the retail entity of DSG International 
plc, the largest retailer of electrical goods in the United Kingdom. Other companies within the 
group were Coverplan Insurance Services Ltd (CIS), Mastercare Coverplan Service Agreements 
Ltd (‘MCSAL’), Mastercare Service and Distribution Ltd (‘MSDL’) and Dixons Insurance 
Services Limited (‘DISL’).  With the exclusion of DISL, the companies are collectively called 
‘the Group’.  For goods sold, DSG offered its customers extended warranties, which continued 
after the one year manufacturing guarantee for an additional period of one to four years, at a 
premium.  (At 2.)  
DISL was established in the Isle of Man on 27 March 1986.  DISL was exempt from tax and 
was not authorised to write insurance in the United Kingdom (at 6.). 
There are two periods which are required to be considered: 
 The first period being ‘the Cornhill period’: Between May 1986 and April 1997 
Cornhill Insurance plc (‘Cornhill’), a third party to the DSG group, was the insurer 
of the extended warranties.  DISL reinsured 95% of the risk, leaving the balance of 
5% of the risk with Cornhill.  Accordingly, 95% of Cornhill’s net premium (after 
commissions paid to CIS for acting as Cornhill’s agent and administration fees paid 
to MSDL for repairs done) was ceded to DISL and in return Cornhill received a 
ceding commission of 1.5% (this was negotiated by the Group instead of DISL) of 
the amount ceded to DISL.  Various agreements were entered into between Cornhill 
and DISL and Cornhill and other group companies, all of which were entered into on 
the same day and which were considered to operate as one agreement.  DSG and 
DISL did not have a direct contractual arrangement.  (At 5 to 10.) 
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 The second period being ‘the ASL period’:  From April 1997 onwards, as a 
consequence of an increase in insurance premium tax which would have reduced 
DISL’s profits, the insured extended warranties were offered as service contracts 
which were issued to customers by a non-group company, Appliance Serviceplan 
Limited (‘ASL’), whose liability was 100% insured by DISL (Field Fisher 
Waterhouse 2010:5).  A similar arrangement was made as per the Cornhill period 
except MCSAL acted as agent for ASL instead of MSDL (Field Fisher Waterhouse 
2010:5).   
The legislation changed during the periods under review as follows: 
 For periods ending before 30 June 1999:  Section 770 of the Income and Corporation 
Taxes Act 1988 was applicable.  There was no reference to the OECD guidelines.  
(At 28 to 29.) 
 For periods ended after 30 June 1999:  Schedule 28AA of the Income and 
Corporation Taxes Act 1988 specifically indicated that guidance from the OECD 
guidelines should be considered (at 29 to 31.). 
HMRC argued the following: 
 DSG contracted with the third party (Cornhill/ASL) based on the consensus that the 
third party would in turn be insured by DISL; 
 The Group had given DISL a ‘business facility’ with the contractual changes in 1993 
whereby Cornhill’s position was disadvantaged whereas DISL’s profit remained 
unchanged, therefore s 770 was potentially applicable; 
 Upon analysing the transactions, it could be shown that the contracts were entered 
into on the basis that they were seen to be ‘a series of interlocking agreements’.  For 
the purposes of Schedule 28AA , the way in which the arrangement was carried out, 
was as if a provision had been made between DSG and DISL; 
 DISL obtained an advantage from the ‘point of sale’ in all DSG stores for which a 
person dealing at arm’s length would have had to pay DSG something for the benefit 
DISL received; 
 While DSG had a number of potential comparable uncontrolled prices, these 
comparables were all rejected due to differences in, inter alia, the market conditions, 
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product differences and the bargaining power for which reliable adjustment could 
not be performed; 
 The profit split method was considered to be the most appropriate method in 
determining the arm’s length return on capital for DISL and allocating the remaining 
profit to DSG since DISL’s profits were dependent on DSG’s ‘point of sales’. 
(Field Fisher Waterhouse 2010:6) 
3.14.2. Judgment 
The Tax Tribunal agreed with the contentions made by HMRC.  The case was adjourned for the 
parties involved to formulate an appropriate profit split for the parties concerned (at 58.). This 
issue was subsequently resolved between HMRC and the taxpayer (Field Fisher Waterhouse 
2010:6).   
3.14.3. Comment on the judgment 
This case provided persuasive authority and confidence for HMRC especially with regard to the 
terms ‘provision’ and ‘series of transactions’ (HMRC 2016c:INTM INTM412050).   
The various entities knew that the different agreements would take effect altogether, so much so 
that they were planned and were seen to be interlocking and interdependent.  The ‘fronter’ 
would not have been contracted with unless it would reinsure with DISL.  The structuring of 
these agreements gave rise to a ‘series of transactions’ as set out at s 150 of the TIOPA, 
therefore, the ‘provision’ was considered to be ‘something different to the transactions’. 
(HMRC 2016c:INTM412050) 
As the principle coming out of this court case (which is where independent third parties are 
interposed, transfer pricing provisions can be applied to those indirect transactions) was of such 
importance, SARS considered it necessary to include the word ‘indirectly’ in drafting the 2012 
transfer pricing legislation so as to include transactions which interpose third parties (Honiball 
and Montsho 2010).  Therefore, South Africa has already taken this judgment into consideration 
in drafting the 2012 transfer pricing legislation (s 31(1)).  
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3.15. Conclusion on the United Kingdom’s transfer pricing legislation and practice 
The following is submitted with regard to the United Kingdom’s transfer pricing legislation and 
practice: 
The United Kingdom’s transfer pricing legislation places total reliance on the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, so much so that HMRC has incorporated the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines into the legislation (s 164 of the TIOPA) thereby implying that there can be no 
deviation from the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.  Furthermore, all HMRC guidance 
relating to the transfer pricing provisions refers to specific paragraphs of the OECD transfer 
pricing guidance (HMRC 2016c).  This gives the taxpayers in-depth guidance on the treatment 
of controlled transactions and how the arm’s length principle should apply to different types of 
transactions and related scenarios (HMRC 2016c).   
The DSG court case has been a cornerstone for the understanding that the term ‘provision’ is 
aligned to Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (PWC 2014:794) and the application 
of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (PWC 2014:798) and in addition provided principles 
and international case authority for other tax administrations around the world, such as South 
Africa, who adopt the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Honiball and Montsho 2010).  
 
THE COMPARISON 
3.16. The comparison of all four countries 
The following comparison can be made from the analysis of all four countries’ transfer pricing 
legislation and practice (the cross references given below indicate the parts of the research 
report where the various issues are discussed for each country): 
 All four countries (South Africa in part 2.1, Kenya in part 3.1.1, India in part 3.6.2 
and the United Kingdom in part 3.11.2) follow the arm’s length principle which, 
according to the OECD, is the underpinning principle for transfer pricing legislation. 
 The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have specifically been included in s 164 of 
the TIOPA in the United Kingdom (part 3.11.2) and they are also referred to in the 
HRMC manuals (part 3.12).  Kenya (part 3.3.1) and India (part 3.8) do not place 
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total reliance on the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines but have included the 
sections where they do place reliance in their rules, which are legally binding on the 
relevant tax authorities.  While South Africa has included the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines in its SARS Practice Notes and draft Interpretation Note, these 
documents are not legally binding documents (part 2.4). 
 While transfer pricing does not usually relate to domestic transactions, India (part 
3.6.2) and the United Kingdom (part 3.11.2) have included domestic transfer pricing 
rules to curb tax arbitrage.  South Africa should consider whether it would be 
feasible to include such provisions in its transfer pricing provisions.  
 South Africa (part 2.2.3) and the United Kingdom (part 3.11.3) have incorporated 
thin capitalisation provisions which are based on the arm’s length principle; 
however, South Africa does not provide adequate guidance on the arm’s length 
principle (part 2.4.1).  Kenya also has thin capitalisation provisions with a 
debt:equity safe harbour of 3:1 (part 3.1.3).  India currently does not have any thin 
capitalisation provisions in its legislation, but has proposed to introduce such 
legislation with effect from 1 April 2018 (part 3.6.4). 
 The burden of proof is on the taxpayer for all four countries (South Africa in part 
2.2.5, Kenya in part 3.1.2, India in part 3.6.2 and the United Kingdom in part 3.11.2)   
 South Africa (part 2.2.4), currently, is the only country amongst the four countries 
that applies a secondary adjustment to the primary transfer pricing adjustment 
(Kenya in part 3.1.2, India in part 3.6.2 and the United Kingdom in part 3.11.2).  
That being said, India will be introducing a secondary adjustment with effect from 1 
April 2018 (part 3.6.2). 
 None of the countries analysed impose specific penalties relating to the transfer 
pricing adjustment.  All four countries refer to the general penalty provisions, which 
range from 5% to 200%, and the general interest provisions apply.  South Africa’s 
penalties are applied in terms of s 222 of the Tax Administration Act and ranges 
from 5% to 200% of the tax on the amount understated (part 2.3).  Kenya’s penalties 
are applied in terms of s 84 of the Kenyan Tax Procedures Act and ranges from 20% 
to 100% of the principal tax amount (part 3.2).  India’s penalties are applied in terms 
of s 270A of the Indian Income-tax Act and ranges from 50% to 200% of the amount 
of tax under-reported/misrepresented (part 3.7).  The United Kingdom’s penalties 
range from 30% to 100% of the potential lost revenue (part 3.12).   
 Documentation requirements are compulsory in all four countries analysed (Kenya 
in part 3.3.2, India in part 3.8.2 and the United Kingdom in part 3.13.2).  South 
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Africa only recently, with effect from 1 October 2016, introduced compulsory record 
keeping and maintenance of transfer pricing documentation (part 2.4.3).  
 Where documentation requirements are not complied with, all four countries impose 
penalties which vary between the countries.  South Africa imposes the general non-
compliance provision, in terms of s 211 of the Tax Administration Act, which is a 
maximum of R16 000 (part 2.3).  Kenya imposes the general non-compliance 
provision, in terms of s 82 of the Kenyan Tax Procedures Act, which is 10% of the 
amount of tax payable to which the documentation retention failure relates (part 
3.3.2).  India imposes a specific penalty provision, in terms of s 271AA(1) of the 
Indian Income-tax Act, which is 2% of the value of the international 
transaction/specified domestic transaction for each failure (part 3.7).  The United 
Kingdom imposes the general non-compliance provision, in terms of EM4650, 
which is GBP 3 000 (part 3.12).  It is submitted that in comparison to other 
countries, the South African non-compliance penalty is too low.  
 Country-by-country reporting has been adopted by South Africa, India and the 
United Kingdom and is based on the OECD guidelines provided for country-by-
country reporting.  India (part 3.8.3) and the United Kingdom (part 3.13.3) have 
already included the country-by-country reporting provisions in their legislation and 
these are effective from 1 April 2017 and 1 January 2016, respectively.  South Africa 
only recently, in December 2016, approved the country-by-country reporting 
regulations (part 2.4.4).  The author has not been able to establish Kenya’s status on 
the adoption of the country-by-country reporting.  
 Case law is available on transfer pricing in Kenya (parts 3.3.3 and 3.4), India (parts 
3.8.4 and 3.9) and the United Kingdom (parts 3.13.4 and 3.14).  South Africa does 
not have case authority related to transfer pricing provisions (part 2.5.1).  It is 
suggested that, while litigation is a costly affair, it would be beneficial for SARS to 
obtain case authority on the South African transfer pricing provisions. 
 As transfer pricing is complex and each transaction/case is different, adequate staff 
with the necessary skill and knowledge is required to audit such cases.  Kenya has 
invested in their staff by training them locally and abroad to assist them in 
conducting efficient and effective transfer pricing audits (part 3.3.3).  In India the 
transfer pricing unit has increased in size and adequate training is provided to ensure 
the necessary knowledge is transferred to staff (part 3.8.4).  In the United Kingdom 
there are sufficient staff and experts to assist in transfer pricing audits (part 3.13.4).  
South Africa should ensure that the transfer pricing division is adequately staffed 
and the necessary knowledge is provided to them to perform efficient and effective 
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transfer pricing audits.  It should be noted that the author has been unable to 
establish what training has been provided to the South African transfer pricing staff. 
 Double taxation agreements are available in all four countries which can be used to 
exchange information between tax jurisdictions.  While some countries may have an 
extensive double taxation treaty network (such as the United Kingdom in part 
3.13.4), others do not.  Kenya’s treaty network is very limited, therefore exchange of 
information with countries where there are no double taxation agreements would be 
very difficult (part 3.3.3).  South Africa (part 2.5.4) and India (3.8.4) have extensive 
treaty networks but there are no double taxation agreements available with certain 
low tax jurisdiction countries, in these instances obtaining information for taxpayers 
in those jurisdictions would be difficult.  It is also the author’s view that the 
exchange of information is not a quick process and it could take months before the 
information which is requested from another jurisdiction is received.  
 Reliable local comparable data is readily available in India (part 3.8.4) and the 
United Kingdom (part 3.13.4).  For the African countries, South Africa (part 2.5.5) 
and Kenya (3.3.3), while local data is available, it may not be reliable; therefore 
European databases are used for comparability purposes.  The use of European 
comparables is problematic as adjustments are required to make the comparability 
analysis more reliable.  Therefore South Africa and Kenya should determine a way 
in which more reliable local data can be obtained. 
 Advance pricing agreements are available in India (part 3.8.4) and the United 
Kingdom (3.13.4).  South Africa (part 2.5.5) and Kenya (part 3.3.3) have not 
implemented legislation relating to advance pricing agreements.  South Africa 
should consider implementing advance pricing agreements. 
 The audit approach in all countries evaluated is very similar (South Africa in part 
2.5.6, Kenya in part 3.3.3, India in part 3.8.4 and the United Kingdom in part 
3.13.4).  The audit approach starts with the identification of transfer pricing risks, 
based on certain criteria which each tax authority uses.  Thereafter the case will be 
prioritised based on the available resources and the potential revenue to be earned.   
 The prescription period varies amongst all four countries.  In South Africa, the 
prescription period is, in terms of s 99 of the Tax Administration Act, 3 years 
extended to 5 years for transfer pricing cases if notice is served to the taxpayer and 
an unlimited period applies where there has been fraud, misrepresentation or non-
disclosure on the part of the taxpayer (part 2.5.7).  In Kenya, the prescription period 
is 7 years, but where there has been fraud, intentional or gross negligence then the 
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limit does not apply (part 3.3.3).  In India, the prescription period is 33 months, in 
terms of s 153 of the Indian Income-tax Act (part 3.8.4).  In the United Kingdom, the 
prescription period is an unlimited period where there is an enquiry or 4 years 
extended to 6 years for carelessness and 20 years for deliberate errors (part 3.13.4).  
Where there are limited resources to perform transfer pricing audits, the prescription 
period may become an issue as there is insufficient time to perform comprehensive 
audits.  
The next chapter will provide an overview of the OECD guidelines.  
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CHAPTER 4:  The OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines 
This chapter will provide an overview of the OECD guidelines and analyse whether the 
substituted transfer pricing legislation (s 31 of the Act) has been aligned to them. Where it has 
not been aligned, this will be highlighted and recommendations will be made to improve s 31 of 
the Act. 
4.1. History of the OECD 
The OECD is an international organisation which was established in 1961 to assist its member 
countries in growth, change in the market economy and economic development by issuing 
publications and statistics on several topical areas, such as competition, corporate governance, 
electronic commerce, trade and taxation (Davis Tax Committee BEPS Sub-Committee 
2014a:18).  Further goals of the OECD include the expansion of trade globally and the 
development of the global economy which affects both member and non-member countries, 
such as South Africa (Davis Tax Committee BEPS Sub-Committee 2014a:18).  The OECD, 
therefore, requests that non-member countries utilise its recommendations as guidelines (Davis 
Tax Committee BEPS Sub-Committee 2014a:18).  There are currently 35 OECD member 
countries (OECD 2016a).  Brazil, India, the People's Republic of China, Indonesia and South 
Africa are Key Partners of the OECD which provide contributions to the OECD work (OECD 
2016a).  The countries which sit at the OECD table and assist in combating global challenges, 
account for 80% of world trade and investment (OECD 2016a). 
4.2. OECD transfer pricing guidelines 
4.2.1. History 
OECD reports on transfer pricing were first published in 1979 and 1984, thereafter the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines were adopted in 1995, which were subsequently amended and 
updated, the latest publication being in July 2010 (United Nations Department of Economic & 
Social Affairs 2013:7).   
4.2.2. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD 2010) 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines assist Governments in the drafting of legislation which 
is used to combat abusive transfer pricing (O’Halloran 2013).  The OECD Transfer Pricing 
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Guidelines include guidelines, as discussed below, on the arm’s length principle, transfer 
pricing methods, comparability analysis, dispute resolution, documentation, intangible assets, 
intra-group services, cost contribution agreements and business restructurings. 
Chapter 1:  The arm’s length principle 
Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention provides the authoritative 
statement of the arm’s length principle, which is as follows (OECD 2010:33): 
‘[Where] conditions are made or imposed between the two [associated] enterprises in their 
commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between 
independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have 
accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, 
may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.’ 
This Article seeks to adjust profits by treating associated enterprises as if they were operating as 
independent separate parties in order to focus on the transaction itself and whether the 
conditions relating to the transaction would have been different in a comparable uncontrolled 
transaction (OECD 2010:33).  Therefore the analysis of comparable data is of key importance to 
determine what the outcome would have been if the enterprises were independent of each other 
(OECD 2010:33). 
The main reason both OECD member and non-member countries have adopted the arm’s length 
principle is that it puts both associated enterprises and independent enterprises alike on ‘equal 
footing’ for tax purposes, which further avoids competitive tax advantages or disadvantages 
(OECD 2010:34).  In separating these tax considerations and economic decisions, the intention 
of the arm's length principle is to promote the growth of international trade and investment, 
fairly (OECD 2010:34). 
Chapter 2:  Transfer pricing methods 
The OECD provides guidance on methods which can be used to determine whether the arm's 
length principle has been consistently applied taking into account the commercial and financial 
relationship between the associated enterprises (OECD 2010:59).  The methods can be split as 
follows:  
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 The traditional transaction methods are the comparable uncontrolled price method 
(‘CUP method’), the resale price method, and the cost plus method.  These methods 
are preferred over the transactional profit methods and the CUP method is 
considered to be the most favoured method; and 
 Transactional profit methods are the transactional net margin method and the 
transactional profit split method. 
(OECD 2010:59-60) 
The most appropriate method, based on, inter alia, the nature of the transaction, the functional 
analysis and the availability of reliable comparable information, should be used to determine the 
arm’s length price (OECD 2010:59).  There are pros and cons to each of the available methods 
and the one best suited to the circumstances at hand should be elected (OECD 2010:61).  Where 
there are two methods which yield an appropriate arm’s length price, the traditional transaction 
method and more especially the CUP method, should be selected over the other method (OECD 
2010:60). 
Many countries have adopted these methodologies in drafting their transfer pricing legislation 
(Adams & Adams 2016:1).  South Africa has included these methodologies in Practice Note 7 
which is not a binding document (Practice Note 7 is discussed in detail above in part 2.4.2 of 
this report). 
Chapter 3:  Comparability analysis 
In the process of identifying the most appropriate transfer pricing method, the purpose of a 
comparability analysis is to find the most reliable comparables, which is a very subjective 
process, to support the transfer pricing adjustments from both a taxpayer’s and tax 
administrator’s perspective (OECD 2010:107-108).   
Guidance is provided on the steps which can be followed in determining the most reliable 
comparables by accepting or rejecting potential comparables and making necessary 
comparability adjustments to obtain more reliable results (OECD 2010:Ch. 3).   
Upon completing the comparability analysis, an arm’s length range will be derived (OECD 
2010:124).  Where the price is within the arm’s length range, no adjustment will be made, 
however, where it is outside the range, an adjustment would be required to be made, generally 
to the midpoint of the range (OECD 2010:125). 
66 
 
Further guidance has been issued by the OECD on comparability data and developing countries 
(OECD 2014).  Both OECD member and non-member countries regularly express concerns, 
especially with regard to developing countries, regarding the availability and quality of 
independent companies’ financial data which can be used for comparability purposes (OECD 
2014:1).  Due to these difficulties, taxpayers in developing countries may incorrectly apply 
transfer pricing methods to unknowingly unreliable data thereby facing uncertainties in 
complying with transfer pricing regulations (OECD 2014:3).  Furthermore, this could result in 
disputes which may prove difficult to resolve (OECD 2014:3).  Possible approaches to resolving 
this issue are as follows: 
 Expanding access to data sources for comparables:  With the absence of local 
comparables, commercial databases should be used; however, this does come at a 
cost (OECD 2014:4).  The African Tax Administration Forum, supported by the 
OECD, is also carrying out feasibility studies with regard to database options 
available to its members (OECD 2014:4). 
 More effective use of data sources for comparables:  Once a tax administration gains 
access to a commercial database, to effectively make use of it, there needs to be a 
degree of skill and experience to appropriately perform a search in order to identify 
the most appropriate comparables (OECD 2014:5).  The utilisation of foreign 
comparables may also pose a problem as comparability adjustments are required to 
be made which is very subjective and minimal guidance has been provided on such 
adjustments (OECD 2014:5-6). 
 Approaches to reducing reliance on direct comparables:  This can be done, for 
example, by the introduction of additional safe harbours for specific industry 
averages, or by using the ‘sixth method’ (which provides for the utilisation of 
publicly quoted commodity prices for certain commodity transactions) (OECD 
2014:7). 
 Advance pricing agreements and mutual agreement proceedings:  If this process is 
followed, it is likely that tax administrations and taxpayers will work together by 
conducting constructive negotiations in an attempt to reconcile differences in their 
judgements (OECD 2014:8). 
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Chapter 4:  Administrative approach to avoiding and resolving transfer pricing disputes 
This chapter provides a discussion on various procedures which can be applied by tax 
administrators to assist them in resolving disputes caused by transfer pricing adjustments and 
double taxation (OECD 2010:131). 
The main aspects discussed, inter alia, are the following: 
 Penalties:  The objective of penalties is to make the underpayment of tax or non-
compliance of provisions more costly than if the taxpayer complied (OECD 
2010:136).   
 Corresponding adjustments:  This practice can alleviate double taxation where 
transfer pricing adjustments are made in one jurisdiction and which affects an 
associated enterprise in another jurisdiction (OECD 2010:140-141); 
 Secondary adjustments:  Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention does not 
refer to secondary adjustments, therefore it is neither forbidden nor a requirement 
(OECD 2010:152); 
 Safe harbours:  The simple definition of a safe harbour is the setting of rules which 
are automatically accepted as arm’s length by the tax administrator (OECD 
2010:159-160).  The major benefits of the use of safe harbours are the certainty it 
creates, the reduction in compliance requirements for the taxpayer and the ease in 
assessing risk by the tax administrators (OECD 2010:161).  There are also problems 
which are associated with the utilisation of the safe harbour by tax administrators 
such as, inter alia, the result being inconsistent with the arm’s length principle and 
the most appropriate method not being applied in line with OECD principles (OECD 
2010:162).  There is also a separate guideline on safe harbours which was issued by 
the OECD (OECD 2013c); and 
 Advance pricing arrangements:  An advance pricing arrangement is an arrangement 
which determines, through a negotiation process, in advance the arm’s length 
transfer price of a controlled transaction, by setting the criteria (such as the critical 
assumptions, the most appropriate method, and comparability adjustments) for a 
fixed period (OECD 2010:168).  Tax administrators should take care when agreeing 
to critical assumptions which cannot be reliably predicted for a long period of time 
as this may not result in an arm’s length price (OECD 2010:168).  In order to assess 
whether the taxpayer has complied with the advance pricing agreement, the tax 
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administrator may either perform a cycle audit or request that the taxpayer submit an 
annual report demonstrating their compliance (OECD 2010:171).  The advance 
pricing agreement should be cancelled if it is found that the taxpayer provided 
fraudulent information, misrepresented facts or did not comply with the agreement 
(OECD 2010:171-172).  The main advantages of entering into an advance pricing 
arrangement are, inter alia, the provision of certainty, the predictability of the tax 
treatment of a controlled transaction and the elimination of costly litigation expenses 
(OECD 2010:173).  There is also a separate guideline on advance pricing agreements 
which was issued by the OECD (OECD 1999) as well as assistance in drafting 
advance pricing arrangement legislation (OECD Secretariat 2012b). 
Chapter 5:  Documentation 
Both the taxpayer and the tax administrator should endeavour to demonstrate, in good faith, that 
they have determined the transfer pricing adjustment in terms of the arm’s length principle, 
regardless of who carries the burden of proof requirement (OECD 2010:181).  The information 
which is considered to be useful by the OECD is as follows: 
 The overview of the business with business strategies; 
 The group structure with ownership linkages; 
 The sales and operating results for a few years prior to entering into the controlled 
transaction; 
 Details of the controlled transaction with the foreign associated enterprise together 
with the related financial details; and 
 An indication of how the arm’s length price was determined, the method elected 
with reasons, the application thereof, the adjustments and the assumptions made in 
the calculation. 
(OECD 2010:186-187) 
The tax administration should have a right to obtain documentation to verify that the taxpayer 
has complied with the arm’s length principle (OECD 2010:188-189).  That being said, the tax 
administrator should take cognisance of the fact that there should be a balance between the cost 
burden to the taxpayer to prepare such documents and the administrative burden (OECD 
2010:189). 
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Chapter 6:  Special considerations for intangible property 
Intangible property is often very difficult to value, therefore specific guidance is provided by the 
OECD (OECD 2010:191).  Guidance is provided on the most appropriate method to use for 
determining the arm’s length price in relation to commercial activities and marketing activities 
(the use of trademarks or tradenames in conducting marketing activities but not being the legal 
owner thereof), as the intangible property may have a ‘special character’ which makes it 
difficult to perform comparable searches or to find suitable comparables (OECD 2010:191;195-
196). 
Chapter 7:  Special considerations for intra-group services 
Intra-group services provided by multinational enterprises to their associated enterprises may 
vary, but the most common intra-group services are administration, financial, technical and 
commercial services, which are generally available from independent enterprises (OECD 
2010:205).  The main problems with the provision of intra-group services is whether the 
services were actually performed and if they were performed, was the service provided at an 
arm’s length price, therefore guidance is provided on these services (OECD 2010:206).  As a 
general rule, duplicate services should not be provided to a single entity by two or more 
connected-parties within a group of companies (OECD 2010:208). 
Chapter 8:  Cost contribution arrangements 
Guidance is provided on a general basis for the determination of whether cost contribution 
agreements which are entered into between two or more associated enterprises (and possibly 
including independent enterprises) is in accordance with the arm’s length principle (OECD 
2010:219).  A cost contribution agreement is an agreement entered into between associated 
enterprises to share costs, the related risks and to determine the extent of each party’s interest 
associated with developing, producing and obtaining assets, rights or services (OECD 
2010:220).  Mutual benefit is a key concept with cost contribution agreements (OECD 
2010:223).  For a cost contribution agreement to be in accordance with the arm’s length 
principle, each participant’s contribution would have to be consistent with what an independent 
party would have agreed to contribute, based on the resultant benefits, under comparable 
circumstances (OECD 2010:222).  Guidance is provided on, inter alia, how a cost contribution 
agreement should be drawn up and the documentation requirements which should be maintained 
in relation to these agreements, in case of an audit (OECD 2010:Ch. 8). 
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Chapter 9:  Transfer pricing aspects of business restructurings 
Guidance is provided in cases where the business is restructured by the cross-border relocation 
of a multinational enterprise’s functions, assets and/or risks (OECD 2010:235).  Generally, with 
business restructurings, profits will be reallocated amongst the members of the multinational 
group (OECD 2010:236).  The main purpose of this guidance is to discuss whether the profit 
reallocated is consistent with the arm’s length principle and how the arm’s length principle is 
applied to such business restructurings (OECD 2010:236).  Guidance is provided on, inter alia, 
how to audit the business restructuring and what information should be reviewed pre-
restructuring and post-restructuring to determine whether the arm’s length principle has been 
met (OECD 2010:Ch. 9). 
Criticism of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
Whilst the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines provides a theoretical understanding of the arm’s 
length principle, there are occurrences, as indicated below, where the OECD guidelines fall 
short in addressing how to apply the principle in practice (United Nations Department of 
Economic & Social Affairs 2013:410).  
Some people are of the view that the arm’s length principle is inherently flawed as ‘economies 
of scale’ and ‘interrelation of diverse activities’ which is created by an integrated business is not 
taken into account by the separate entity approach (OECD 2010:34). 
Comparability data may also be difficult to find as the transactions which associated enterprises 
enter into are generally not transactions which independent parties would enter into (OECD 
2010:35).  Availability of local comparability data is also a major problem (OECD 2010:35).  
4.3. Country-by-country reporting 
The OECD has developed a three tiered approach to transfer pricing documentation to enhance 
transparency by putting in place provisions whereby multinational enterprises would be required 
to provide the relevant tax administrations with information, on a common template, relating to 
the multinational enterprises’ global allocation of income, economic activity and taxes paid in 
various jurisdictions, but also taking into consideration the compliance costs for business 
(OECD 2015:9).   
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The three tiers would be as follows: 
 First tier being the provision of tax administrations with an overview of the 
multinational enterprise’s global business operations and transfer pricing policies in a 
‘master file’ which would be available to all relevant tax administrations. 
 Second tier being a ‘local file’ which provides country specific detailed transactional 
transfer pricing documentation, identifying substantial related party transactions, the 
related values, and the entity’s analysis of the transfer pricing arm’s length 
considerations concerning those transactions. 
 Third tier relates to large multinational enterprises which are required to file a country-
by-country report that will be filed on an annual basis for each jurisdiction in which 
they perform their business.  The report would also include the identification of the 
entity; the tax jurisdiction of incorporation; its residence if different from jurisdiction of 
incorporation; the nature of its business; the amount of revenue, the profit before 
income tax and the income tax paid and accrued; the number of employees in its 
employ; the stated capital; the retained earnings and the tangible assets in each tax 
jurisdiction.  
(OECD 2015:9) 
These three documents (master file, local file and country-by-country report) altogether will 
require multinational enterprises to express consistent transfer pricing positions for the entire 
group of companies and will provide tax administrations with useful information to assist in 
assessing transfer pricing risks, provide a basis for audit enquiries and determine the most 
effective use of audit resources (OECD 2015:9).  This information will provide tax 
administrations with a base for identifying whether companies have used transfer pricing and 
other practices to shift income to tax-advantaged jurisdictions (OECD 2015:9).  The countries 
which are participating in the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project, such as South Africa, 
have agreed that these reporting provisions will encourage and contribute to the primary 
objective of controlling base erosion and profit shifting (OECD 2015:9). 
4.4. Conclusion on the OECD guidelines 
It is submitted that the OECD’s practice and the arm’s length principle is international best 
practice which is the reason why even OECD non-member countries follow the OECD 
approach and guidelines.  Even the courts of law have used the OECD principles and guidelines 
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to assess the circumstances and determine a judgment as was the case in Unilever Kenya Ltd 
(discussed above in part 3.4 of this report).  
While there may be criticism of certain aspects of the OECD guidelines (for example, 
comparable data), they provide a starting point for most tax administrations with regard to both 
legislation and different aspects and possible scenarios which multinational enterprises could 
possibly enter into to shift profits to low tax jurisdictions, thereby not complying with the arm’s 
length principle.  
4.5. OECD and South Africa 
Before the introduction of the South African transfer pricing legislation, the Katz Commission 
stated that the OECD guidelines should be applied, reason being that the OECD’s influence in 
international trade and investment has grown to such an extent that the OECD guidelines 
constituted a ‘common language’ amongst trading and investment countries (Katz 1995:3). 
As majority of developed countries have transfer pricing provisions in their tax legislation, it 
means that foreign investors are accustomed to the application of such transfer pricing 
regulations and they ought to have strict policies, within their group of companies, to ensure that 
their cross-border inter-company transactions are performed at arm's length (Katz 1995:5). 
South Africa has adopted the arm’s length approach as recommended by the Katz Commission 
and therefore looks to the OECD for guidance as the OECD supports fair tax practices around 
the world (O’Halloran 2013).  Additionally, South African courts have endorsed the 
commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention (Davis Tax Committee BEPS Sub-
Committee 2014a:18), demonstrating, it is submitted, that the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines are international best practice.   
In 2004, South Africa was awarded OECD observer status (Davis Tax Committee BEPS Sub-
Committee 2014a:18), it has enhanced engagement with the OECD, is an observer to the 
OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs (Strydom and Kitcat 2013) and is a member of the OECD 
BEPS Committee (Davis Tax Committee BEPS Sub-Committee 2014a:18).   
South Africa has adopted the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in many aspects, such as: 
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 The Commissioner has endorsed the five OECD transfer pricing methods (as indicated 
in chapter 2 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines), using the most appropriate 
method to perform the calculation of the arm’s length price (SARS 1999:13). 
 Detailed guidance on comparability analysis is provided in Practice Note 7 which also 
refers to certain paragraphs of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD 1999:9-
12). 
 The notice to keep transfer pricing documentation (SARS 2016b), effective from 1 
October 2016, incorporates the documentation indicated in chapter 5 of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines.  
 Reference has been made to chapters 6, 7 and 8 of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for guidance on intangible assets, intra-group services and cost contribution 
agreements, respectively, in SARS Practice Note 7 (SARS 1999:34). 
While South Africa has adopted the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as indicated above, it 
has not adopted these guidelines in totality, by not implementing certain aspects which are 
recommended by the OCED, such as: 
 Advance pricing agreements which were recommended by the Katz Commission to be 
incorporated into the South African transfer pricing legislation but were never 
implemented (Deloitte 2016:236).  Advance pricing agreements are beneficial tools to 
possibly further enhance foreign direct investment by providing certainty.  Furthermore, 
the introduction of advance pricing agreements could assist in avoiding lengthy audits 
and disputes thereby effectively utilising resources and saving time (OECD 2010:173);  
 Corresponding adjustments are not provided for in s 31 of the Act.  If South Africa does 
introduce corresponding adjustments, this may be a further incentive for foreign 
investors; and 
 SARS Practice Note 7 does not refer to chapter 9, which deals with transfer pricing 
aspects of business restructurings, as it was only incorporated into the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines in 2010 and the Practice Note has not been updated since 1999 
(SARS 1999). 
Additionally, South Africa encounters difficulties with obtaining reliable local comparable data, 
as is the case with most developing countries (OECD 2014:1), hence they make use of 
European databases for comparability purposes (Deloitte 2015:199).  
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It is submitted that South Africa should consider, at the very least, introducing advance pricing 
agreements.  
The next chapter will summarise the findings of the research.  
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CHAPTER 5:  Conclusions and recommendations 
This chapter will summarise the findings of the research as well as propose recommendations 
related to all weaknesses/loopholes identified in s 31 of the Act and will provide an indication 
of areas requiring improvement with respect to the South African transfer pricing legislation (s 
31 of the Act) and guidelines.  This chapter will also indicate areas which will require further 
research.  
5.1. Comment on the South African transfer pricing legislation as a whole 
The substituted South African transfer pricing provisions in s 31 of the Act include wording 
which is aligned with the OECD Model Tax Convention, which focuses on the economic 
substance of the related party transaction, rather than the pricing of the specific transaction 
(Brodbeck 2012). 
It is submitted that the substituted South African transfer pricing legislation has provided SARS 
with a much wider scope of inspecting and auditing transfer pricing transactions as a result of 
the inclusion of the definition of ‘affected transaction’ which has assisted in shifting the focus 
from a single transaction approach to an entity-based approach which is a more holistic 
approach (discussed above in part 2.2 of this report).  It is further submitted that this definition, 
in s 31 of the Act, is also aligned to the definition of ‘arrangement’ under the general anti-
avoidance provisions (s 80A to s 80L of the Act), thereby providing SARS with an alternative 
basis for assessment if the transfer pricing (s 31) basis of assessment fails. 
5.2. How should the South African transfer pricing legislation be improved? 
The following is submitted on how the South African transfer pricing legislation can be 
improved: 
SARS should consider incorporating the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in the primary 
legislation, being s 31 of the Act, instead of merely referring to them in the outdated SARS 
Practice Note 7 and the draft Interpretation Note for thin capitalisation which are not legally 
binding documents (above in part 2.4.2 of this report).  If the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines are included in the legislation, they will be legally binding, and guidance can be 
obtained directly from the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which are considered to be 
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international best practice, as can be seen from the Unilever Kenya Ltd case (above in part 3.4 
of this report).  
India (above in part 3.6.2 of this report) and the United Kingdom (above in part 3.11.2 of this 
report) have limited the transfer pricing adjustment to upward/positive transfer pricing 
adjustments.  South Africa should consider where it should introduce a limitation to the transfer 
pricing adjustment; however this may have an adverse effect on direct foreign investment. 
India and the United Kingdom have introduced domestic transfer pricing rules (above in part 
3.16 of this report).  An example of this tax arbitrage would be where a local taxpayer who is in 
a tax loss position earns excessive non-arm’s length revenue from the provision of services or 
sale of goods to a domestic/local connected party who obtains excessive deductions.  While 
there may be provisions in the Act which could possibly be used to curb this tax arbitrage, such 
as the ‘in the production of income test’ in s 11(a) that can be applied to certain expenditure that 
is excessive as a result of it not being market related (Haupt 2016:139); s 20A providing that the 
assessed loss of certain trades should be ring-fenced; s 103(2) which disallows the utilisation of 
assessed losses when there is a change in shareholding of the entity or an agreement which 
results in income in the said entity; or s 80A being the general anti-avoidance provision.  
Further research should be performed on this aspect within South Africa to determine whether 
there is a need to introduce domestic transfer pricing legislation.   
Advance pricing agreements were suggested by the Katz Commission, nevertheless, 21 years 
later this process has still not been implemented (above in part 2.1 of this report).  SARS should 
consider introducing advance pricing agreements into the transfer pricing legislation which will 
provide certainty to taxpayers and foreign multinational enterprises.  It may possibly also attract 
more foreign direct investment.  Advance pricing agreements could also eliminate lengthy audit 
periods as the assumptions, the most appropriate method and the adjustments are agreed upon 
upfront, and SARS will only be required to perform an annual audit (should it choose this 
method as recommended by the OECD, discussed above in part 4.2.2 of this report) to ensure 
that the taxpayer is complying with the advance pricing agreement.  This is an area where 
further research can be performed to determine whether it is feasible to introduce advance 
pricing agreements, taking into consideration the available staff with sufficient transfer pricing 
knowledge. 
The South African country-by-country reporting regulations were finalised and approved in 
December 2016 (above in part 2.4.4 of this report).  Only time will tell whether the country-by-
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country reporting is an effective tool or not, not only for South Africa but for all jurisdictions 
which are implementing these regulations globally. 
5.3. Penalties relating to transfer pricing adjustments 
There are no specific penalties which are imposed for the South African transfer pricing 
regulations.   
All three countries evaluated (Kenya, India and the United Kingdom), as is the case in South 
Africa, refer to the general penalty provisions for under-reported income (above in part 3.16 of 
this report).  It is submitted that the major problem identified with the South African 
understatement penalty (in terms of s 223 of the Tax Administration Act) is the subjectivity of 
the ‘behaviours’ which are selected in order to impose the penalty.  The author is of the view 
that if a specific penalty is imposed on a transfer pricing adjustment made by SARS, it may 
deter taxpayers from incorrectly calculating the arm’s length consideration, therefore a specific 
transfer pricing penalty should be introduced.  This penalty could be based on a percentage of 
the transfer pricing adjustment or a tiered penalty based on the value of the ‘affected 
transaction’ should be implemented.  
Furthermore, the penalty to be imposed (in terms s 210 and s 211 of the Tax Administration 
Act) for non-compliance with documentation retention requirements is too low.  It is submitted 
that a fixed penalty of a higher amount or a percentage based penalty (as is the case in India 
indicated above in part 3.7 of this report) should be imposed on the taxpayer to enforce 
compliance with documentation retention.  
5.4. How should SARS’ guidance be improved? 
The following is submitted on how SARS’ guidance can be improved: 
SARS should provide appropriate current guidance on thin capitalisation, with only a draft 
Interpretation Note (SARS 2013c) having being released in 2013 and no subsequent re-draft for 
comment.  This is most disturbing as it leaves taxpayers in limbo as to how to determine what 
‘arm’s length’ is in relation to thin capitalisation.  Furthermore, in the draft Interpretation Note 
there are no safe harbours provided which can be beneficial to include for both the taxpayers 
and SARS as if there are safe harbours in place, it is less time consuming to audit and is 
administratively less burdensome for the taxpayer. 
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The much talked about Interpretation Note on s 31 (Joubert et al2016:2) should be drafted and 
released by SARS as soon as possible.  This will provide SARS with the opportunity to update 
outdated Practice Note 2 and Practice Note 7 and to provide more appropriate guidance to 
taxpayers based on the updated 2010 OECD guidelines as well as incorporate and address issues 
of base erosion and profit shifting. 
If SARS does not incorporate the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines into the Act, at least one 
legally binding general ruling, in term of s 89 of the Tax Administration Act should be executed 
on s 31 of the Act (Davis Tax Committee BEPS Sub-Committee 2014b:16-17), for the sake of 
providing legal status to the principles included in Practice Notes or Interpretation Notes dealing 
with the provisions of s 31 of the Act. 
India and the United Kingdom have very comprehensive guidance on each section of the 
relevant transfer pricing provisions as well as providing examples relating to definitions used.  
South Africa should use this approach in the drafting of the impending Interpretation Note 
dealing with the provisions of s 31 of the Act. 
5.5. Other considerations 
It is submitted that SARS should consider moving to a self-assessment system as soon as 
possible which will assist them in extending the original prescription period, in terms of s 99 of 
the Tax Administration Act, from 3 years to 5 years.  This will afford SARS additional time to 
conduct detailed risk assessments and to perform more in-depth audits of multinational 
taxpayers.   
It is further submitted that for SARS to ensure that efficient and comprehensive audits are 
performed within the necessary time-frames, which are currently very short, it is crucial for 
SARS to employ sufficient transfer pricing staff and provide them with sufficient training in 
order to enhance their transfer pricing knowledge and skill.   
While South Africa can make use of case law in other jurisdictions, it is the author’s view that 
SARS should take cases to court in order to provide case law and to confirm the arm’s length 
principle as well as other principles for South African transfer pricing purposes.   
Comparable data is a major problem for most developing countries (OECD2014:3), like South 
Africa.  While South Africa makes use of European comparables (Joubert et al 2016:3), 
geographical adjustments and other adjustments are required to be made to make the data more 
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reliable and relevant to South Africa.  The OECD has made possible recommendations with 
regard to this problem, none of which provides a concrete solution, in the author’s view, as 
further research is still being conducted (OECD 2014:9-11).  This may be an area where further 
research can be performed to determine whether there is an appropriate method for South Africa 
to readily obtain reliable local comparable data.  
5.6. Overall conclusion 
From the research conducted in this report, it can be seen that there are improvements which can 
be made to the South African transfer pricing provisions, guidance and the related 
administration of the transfer pricing provisions.  The author has also identified areas where 
further research can be conducted to determine whether it is feasible for SARS to consider and 
implement new or amended provisions that could possibly enhance the transfer pricing 
legislation. 
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Appendix 1:  South African transfer pricing legislation (s 31 of the Act) 
31.   Tax payable in respect of international transactions to be based on arm’s length 
principle.—(1)  For the purposes of this section— 
“affected transaction” means any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding 
where— 
(a) that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding has been directly or 
indirectly entered into or effected between or for the benefit of either or both— 
(i) (aa)  a person that is a resident; and 
(bb)  any other person that is not a resident; 
(ii) (aa)  a person that is not a resident; and 
(bb) any other person that is not a resident that has a permanent establishment in 
the Republic to which the transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or 
understanding relates; 
(iii) (aa)  a person that is a resident; and 
(bb)  any other person that is a resident that has a permanent establishment 
outside the Republic to which the transaction, operation, scheme, 
agreement or understanding relates; or 
(iv) (aa)  a person that is not a resident; and 
(bb)  any other person that is a controlled foreign company in relation to any 
resident, 
and those persons are connected persons in relation to one another; and 
(b) any term or condition of that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding 
is different from any term or condition that would have existed had those persons been 
independent persons dealing at arm’s length; 
 
“financial assistance” includes any— 
(a) debt; or 
(b) security or guarantee. 
 
(2)  Where— 
(a)  any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding constitutes an affected 
transaction; and 
(b)  any term or condition of that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or 
understanding— 
(i)  is a term or condition contemplated in paragraph (b) of the definition of “affected 
transaction”; and 
(ii)  results or will result in any tax benefit being derived by a person that is a party to 
that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding, 
the taxable income or tax payable by any person contemplated in paragraph (b) (ii) that derives 
a tax benefit contemplated in that paragraph must be calculated as if that transaction, operation, 
scheme, agreement or understanding had been entered into on the terms and conditions that 
would have existed had those persons been independent persons dealing at arm’s length. 
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(3)  To the extent that there is a difference between— 
(a)  any amount that is, after taking subsection (2) into account, applied in the calculation of 
the taxable income of any resident that is a party to an affected transaction; and 
(b)  any amount that would, but for subsection (2), have been applied in the calculation of the 
taxable income of the resident contemplated in paragraph (a), 
the amount of that difference must, if that person is a resident and the other person to the 
affected transaction is a person as contemplated in paragraph (a) (i) (bb) or (a) (iii) (bb) of the 
definition of “affected transaction”— 
(i) if that resident is a company, be deemed to be a dividend consisting of a 
distribution of an asset in specie declared and paid by that resident to that other 
person; or 
(ii) if that resident is a person other than a company, be deemed, for purposes of Part 
V, to be a donation made by that resident to that other person, 
on the last day of the period of six months following the end of the year of assessment in respect 
of which that adjustment is made: Provided that where the amount of that difference was prior 
to 1 January 2015 deemed to be a loan that constitutes an affected transaction, so much of that 
loan as has not been repaid before 1 January 2015 must— 
(a)  if that resident is a company, be deemed to be a dividend consisting of a distribution of an 
asset in specie that was declared and paid by that resident to that other person; or 
(b)  if that resident is a person other than a company, be deemed, for purposes of Part V, to be 
a donation made by that resident to that other person, 
on 1 January 2015. 
 
(4)  For the purposes of subsection (2), where any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or 
understanding has been directly or indirectly entered into or effected as contemplated in that 
subsection in respect of— 
(a) the granting of any financial assistance; or 
(b) intellectual property as contemplated in the definition of “intellectual property” in section 
23I (1) or knowledge, 
“connected person” means a connected person as defined in section 1: Provided that the 
expression “and no holder of shares holds the majority voting rights in the company” in 
paragraph (d) (v) of that definition must be disregarded. 
 
(5)  Where any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding has been entered 
into between a headquarter company and— 
(a)  any other person that is not a resident and that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement 
or understanding is in respect of the granting of financial assistance by that other person 
to that headquarter company, this section does not apply to so much of that financial 
assistance that is directly applied as financial assistance to any foreign company in which 
the headquarter company directly or indirectly (whether alone or together with any other 
company forming part of the same group of companies as that headquarter company) 
holds at least 10 per cent of the equity shares and voting rights; 
(b) any foreign company in which the headquarter company directly or indirectly (whether 
alone or together with any other company forming part of the same group of companies 
as that headquarter company) holds at least 10 per cent of the equity shares and voting 
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rights and that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding comprises the 
granting of financial assistance by that headquarter company to that foreign company, this 
section does not apply to that financial assistance; 
 (c) any other person that is not a resident and that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement 
or understanding is in respect of the granting of the use, right of use or permission to use 
any intellectual property as defined in section 23I (1) by that other person to that 
headquarter company, this section does not apply to the extent that the headquarter 
company— 
(i)  grants that use, right of use or permission to use that intellectual property to any 
foreign company in which the headquarter company directly or indirectly 
(whether alone or together with any other company forming part of the same 
group of companies as that headquarter company) holds at least 10 per cent of the 
equity shares and voting rights; and 
(ii)  does not make use of that intellectual property otherwise than as contemplated in 
subparagraph (i); or 
 (d)  any foreign company in which the headquarter company directly or indirectly (whether 
alone or together with any other company forming part of the same group of companies 
as that headquarter company) holds at least 10 per cent of the equity shares and voting 
rights and that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding comprises the 
granting of the use, right of use or permission to use any intellectual property as defined 
in section 23I (1) by that headquarter company to that foreign company, this section does 
not apply to that granting to that foreign company. 
 
(6)  Where any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding that comprises the 
granting of— 
(a)  financial assistance; or 
(b)  the use, right of use or permission to use any intellectual property as defined in section 
23I, 
by a person that is a resident (other than a headquarter company) to a controlled foreign 
company in relation to that resident or in relation to a company that forms part of the same 
group of companies as that resident, this section must not be applied in calculating the taxable 
income or tax payable by that resident in respect of any amount received by or accrued to that 
resident in terms of that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding if— 
(i) . . . . . . 
(ii) that controlled foreign company has a foreign business establishment as defined 
in section 9D (1); and 
(iii) the aggregate amount of tax payable to all spheres of government of any country 
other than the Republic by that controlled foreign company in respect of any 
foreign tax year of that controlled foreign company during which that transaction, 
operation, scheme, agreement or understanding exists is at least 75 per cent of the 
amount of normal tax that would have been payable in respect of any taxable 
income of that controlled foreign company had that controlled foreign company 
been a resident for that foreign tax year: Provided that the aggregate amount of 
tax so payable must be determined— 
(aa)  after taking into account any applicable agreement for the prevention of 
double taxation and any credit, rebate or other right of recovery of tax from 
any sphere of government of any country other than the Republic; and 
(bb)  after disregarding any loss in respect of a year other than that foreign tax 
year or from a company other than that controlled foreign company. 
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(7)  Where— 
(a)  any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding has been entered into 
between a company that is a resident (for purposes of this subsection referred to as 
“resident company”) or any company that forms part of the same group of companies as 
that resident company and any foreign company in which that resident company (whether 
alone or together with any other company that forms part of the same group of companies 
as that resident company) directly or indirectly holds in aggregate at least 10 per cent of 
the equity shares and voting rights and that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or 
understanding comprises the granting of financial assistance that constitutes a debt owed 
by that foreign company to that resident company or any company that forms part of the 
same group of companies as that resident company; 
(b)  that foreign company is not obliged to redeem that debt in full within 30 years from the 
date the debt is incurred; 
(c) the redemption of the debt in full by the foreign company is conditional upon the market 
value of the assets of the foreign company not being less than the market value of the 
liabilities of the foreign company; and 
(d) no interest accrued in respect of the debt during the year of assessment, 
this section must not apply to that debt. 
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Appendix 2: Overview of the Indian transfer pricing provisions in the Indian Income-tax 
Act and the related rules  
Description Section of the Indian Income-tax Act The rules 
Coverage and 
computation in terms of 
the arm's length price 
Section 92 N/a 
Definitions Sections 92A (Associated enterprise); 92B 
(International transaction); 92BA (Specified 
domestic transactions); and 92F (Accountant, 
Arm's length price, Enterprise, Permanent 
establishment, Specified date, Transaction) 
Rule 10A 
Methods of computation 
of the arm's length price 
Section 92C(1) to 92C(2B)  Rules 10AB (any 
other method for 
determining the 
arm's length price), 
10B and 10C 
Administrative 
provisions 
Section 92C(3) (Determination of the arm’s 
length price with the information on hand), 
92C(4) (Computation of the assessee’s total 
income based on the determined arm’s length 
price); 92CA (Transfer pricing officer) and 
144 (Best judgement assessment) 
N/a 
Safe harbour rules Section 92CB Rules 10TA to 
10TG 
Advance pricing 
agreements 
Section 92CC and 92CD (Effect of advance 
pricing agreement) 
Rules 10F to 10T 
Maintenance of 
information and 
documents  
Section 92D  Rule 10D 
Accountant’s’ Report  Section 92E  Rule 10E and Form 
3CEB 
Penalties  Sections 270A (Under-reporting and 
misreporting of income); 271AA (Failure to 
keep and maintain information and 
documents in respect of certain transactions); 
271BA; 271G (Failure to furnish information 
or document under s 92D); and 271(1) read 
with explanation 7  
N/a 
Transaction with person 
located in notified 
jurisdictional area 
Section 94A  Rule 21AC and 
Form 10FC 
Base erosion and profit 
shifting 
Section 286 N/a 
(RSM India 2016:24) 
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